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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Burdensharing Dilemma 
 
 On November 23, 2010, North Korean artillery shelled South Korean forces stationed on 
Yeonpyeong Island, killing four in one of the most serious clashes since the Korean War. South 
Korean artillery responded in kind within minutes. The crisis eventually stabilized, but not 
before another exchange of fire. 
Peace may not have prevailed, however, if the Washington had not restrained Seoul from 
further escalation. Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense at the time of the incident, wrote in his 
memoir that “South Korea’s original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionately 
aggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery.”1 The South Korean government has declined to 
comment on Gates’s version of events.2 Yet it is obvious there had been calls in the South for a 
more forceful approach to North Korea’s military provocations, especially since after the March 
26 sinking of the Cheonan. South Korean President Park Geun-hye has since adopted a policy of 
‘active deterrence.’ Her military commanders will now counter attacks immediately without 
regard for “political considerations,” perhaps including strikes on North Korean nuclear sites.3 
This has raised the distinct possibility of US involvement in a peninsular war without either its 
foreknowledge or consent.4 
 This is just a brief story of one trilateral relationship, but it exposes a great deal about the 
nature of American alliances in the post-World War II era. In a November 2012 speech at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), National Security Adviser Thomas 
                                                
1 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014): 497. 
2 “Gates Says US Prevented South Korea Airstrike on North,” Defense News, January 15, 2014. 
3 “South Korea Leader Park Geun-Hye Vows to Strike Back at North Korea,” News.com.au, April 2, 2013. 
4 Patrick M. Cronin, “If Deterrence Fails: Rethinking Conflict on the Korean Peninsula,” Center for a New 
American Security (March 2014): 11-12. 
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Donilon likened alliances to “assets on a balance sheet.”5 Yet the alliance problems detailed 
above show they can also be liabilities. 
 Since the early Cold War, the United States has maintained a system of extended 
deterrence around the world. Its centerpiece, in contradistinction to other eras of great power 
politics, has been the physical garrisoning of allied territory. To deter would-be aggressors, 
Americans have demonstrated with this ‘tripwire’ strategy that they could not possibly avoid 
involvement. Even so, Washington has often recognized the costs of such a total commitment for 
intra-alliance management. When an adversary knows the United States is automatically 
committed, so does the security partner. Although America may not want war and its enemy may 
be deterred, an ally’s actions may still spark conflict in a phenomenon known as ‘entrapment.’ 
I argue in the following chapters that in the postwar era, Americans have confronted a 
‘burdensharing dilemma.’ There is risk to an ally having the capacity for independent military 
action. On the one hand, the demands of collective defense against American or mutual 
adversaries incentivize policymakers towards the growth of allied military power. In a myriad of 
ways, US officials have hoped countries like South Korea, Japan, and West Germany would 
share more of common burden in both cold and hot wars. Yet on the other hand, America has 
feared cases of ‘tactical entrapment’ and ‘strategic entrapment,’ whereby an ally’s autonomous 
capacity is used to cause war or destabilize a security environment such that war becomes more 
likely. When Washington enters into an extended deterrence that includes a tripwire, there are 
strong geopolitical reasons to suppress that ally’s ability to defend itself. Otherwise, in the 
analogy most beloved by International Relations (IR) scholars, an open-ended commitment 
would be like sitting in the passenger seat in a game of chicken. 
                                                
5 Tom Donilon, “President Obama's Asia Policy and Upcoming Trip to the Region” (speech, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, Washington, D.C., November 15, 2012). 
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 By establishing mechanisms of control such as consultation, the discouragement of 
specific types of rearmament, and the removal of allied decisionmaking power over the activity 
of their own armed forces, Americans have tried to grab both horns of the burdensharing 
dilemma and overcome it. To some extent, they have been successful. But the burdensharing 
dilemma has not gone away. Its tradeoffs and dangers, whether recognized or not, continue to 
plague US alliance management in the Rebalance to Asia much as they did in the Cold War.6 
The outline of this essay is as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the literature on extended 
deterrence and alliance restraint, forward deployments and automaticity in post-WWII American 
alliances, and the economic rather than strategic explanations of alliance burdensharing. I also 
present my theory of the burdensharing dilemma more fully and explain my methods and scope. 
In Chapter 3, I examine my theory in the case of the US-Japan alliance in the Cold War, and in 
Chapter 4, I analyze a second case study of the same alliance in the Rebalance or Pivot to Asia. 
My conclusion is found in Chapter 5. 
  
                                                
6 For a brief look at the burdensharing dilemma today, see Jake A. Douglas, “Why Washington Can’t Restrain 
Tokyo,” The Diplomat, March 4, 2014. 
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Chapter 2: The Burdensharing Dilemma in US Alliances 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I make a case for the existence and importance of a burdensharing 
dilemma in US alliances. First, I review the literature on alliance restraint, commitments, and 
burdensharing. Second, I outline my theory of the burdensharing dilemma. Third, I explain my 
methods and the scope of the theory. 
 
Literature review 
To explain the burdensharing dilemma, it is first necessary to explore the state of political 
science on three distinct but intertwined literatures: extended deterrence and alliance restraint; 
commitments and credibility in the American style of extended deterrence; and alliance 
burdensharing. Together, they provide the intellectual background for my theory. 
 
Extended deterrence and alliance restraint 
When a state uses extended deterrence to prevent international conflict, the dynamics 
internal to alliances are just as important as those external to it. Both allies and adversaries must 
be deterred from sparking an unwanted war. Scholars have encapsulated these twin imperatives 
into the terms “pivotal deterrence”7 and “dual deterrence.”8 In short, the multilateral character of 
                                                
7 Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2003).  
8 Robert Jervis, “What Do We Want to Deter and How Do We Deter It?” in Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. 
Military Strategy, ed. L. Benjamin Edington and Michael J. Mazarr (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 122-124. 
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extended deterrence means there are many members in a dispute. Restraint is required even of 
friendly parties.  
 Alliances almost always have more than one function, one of which is usually control. 
Too often, observers of world politics focus on alliances’ role as aggregators of national military 
power. This omission is understandable, since their most visible purpose is warfighting. When 
national survival seems at stake, all policy questions center around pooling resources. In 
peacetime, however, their goal is often manipulation. The first scholar to talk about alliance 
restraint, Paul Schroeder, argued that International Relations (IR) theorists and historians fixate 
on alliances as “weapons of power” at the expense of their function as “tools of management”—
or “pacta de contrahendo.” In his study of traditional European diplomacy, Schroeder found 
states forming coalitions to increase their influence over one another.9 Likewise, Jeremy 
Pressman claims this activity has received little scholarly attention.10 He defines alliance restraint 
as “an actual or anticipated diplomatic effort to influence a second ally not to proceed with a 
proposed military policy or not to continue an existing military policy.”11 Glenn Snyder similarly 
noted that “[a]lthough the primary purpose of most alliances is to gain security against an 
opponent, an important secondary goal is to restrain or control the ally.”12 Robert Osgood named 
two main functions of alliances: the “accretion of power” and “to restrain and control allies, 
particularly in order to safeguard one ally against actions of another that might endanger its 
                                                
9 “All alliances functioned as… restraining or controlling the actions of the partners in the alliance themselves. 
Frequently the desire to exercise such control over an ally’s policy was the main reason that one power, or both, 
entered into the alliance.” Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of 
Management,” in Klaus Knorr, ed. Historical Problems of National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: University of 
Kansas Press, 1976), 230-1. An example is the Austro-Neapolitan secret alliance of June 1815, which Schroeder 
says traded Austrian control over Naples’s domestic and foreign politics in return for security guarantees. Ibid., 232-
233. 
10 Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2008), 2. 
11 Ibid., 6. 
12 Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 320. He mentions, for instance, that 
a “secondary purpose of NATO is to control Germany.” Ibid. 
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security or otherwise jeopardize its interests.”13 Victor Cha has argued the East Asian alliance 
system has its origins in US “powerplay,” or “the construction of an asymmetric alliance 
designed to exert maximum control over the smaller ally’s actions.”14 David A. Lake writes that 
states often create hierarchical relationships that exchange security for control over the 
subordinate state’s ability to act “opportunistically.”15 In fine, alliance restraint is a frequent 
concern of states and statesmen, and this worry often conditions alliance policies. Even Sun Tzu 
cautioned, “Not knowing the strategies of the feudal lords / One cannot ally with them.”16 The 
strategist must be wary even of his own friends, since they will have dreams and nightmares of 
their own. 
The main reason that allies might want to restraint their partners is the possibility of 
entrapment. Tongfi Kim defines it as “a form of undesirable entanglement in which the 
entangling state adopts a risky or offensive policy not specified in the alliance agreement.”17 
Theorists since Carl von Clausewitz have lamented that “a forced or tottering alliance” may 
bring war as “a matter of disagreeable duty.”18 Entrapment is one side of what Snyder called the 
“alliance security dilemma,” or the tradeoffs between entrapment and “abandonment” in alliance 
                                                
13 Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968): 21-22. 
Osgood adduces the U.S.-Japan alliance as an example of dual deterrence: “The treaties of peace and security with 
Japan… were intended to control Japan as well as to contain China and Russia,” arguing that “[i]n some cases 
America’s alliance have also served as useful restraints on allies, helping to stabilize international politics by giving 
the United States access to, and influence upon, governments with potentially disruptive local grievances and 
ambitions.” Ibid., 78, 114. 
14 Victor Cha, “Powerplay Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34:3 (2009): 158. 
15 “In a protectorate, one state cedes control to another over important areas of national policy, most notably foreign 
affairs… Such delegations of authority transfer residual rights of control in the designated areas from the ‘protected’ 
state to the ‘protector’ and severely constrain the former’s ability to influence the policy choices the latter makes for 
it.” David A. Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,” International Organization 
50:1 (1996): 8. 
16 Sun Tzu, The Art of War: Translation, Essays, and Commentaries, trans. by the Denna Translation Group 
(Boston: Shambahla Publications, 2001), 57. 
17 Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrapment,” Security Studies 20:3 (2011): 353. As the title of 
his article suggests, Kim argues that entrapment is rare because policymakers consciously structure and manage 
alliances in ways that avoid it, and scholars usually conflate “entanglement,” which is desirable for the sake of 
extended deterrence, with “entrapment,” which is never desirable. Ibid., 354-355. 
18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1976). 
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decisions. Excessively tight commitments could embolden an ally. Taking advantage of one’s 
support, the protected state may then intentionally or unintentionally provoke war with an 
adversary. As Osgood warned, “the luxury of assured protection encourages a freedom of 
maneuver and irresponsibility on the part of the protected that is denied the protector.”19 On the 
other hand, loose commitments may encourage an ally to defect to the other side or not support 
one’s cause. States may want to “distance” themselves from their allies in times of danger, but 
doing so risks shattering the alliance.20  
Adversary relations further complicate the desire to avoid entrapment. In his “composite 
security dilemma,” a model that integrates a state’s relationships with both its adversaries and its 
allies, Snyder offers two “subdilemmas.” In the deter versus restrain dilemma, “ [a] state may 
wish to maintain an image of firmness in order to deter the adversary, but at the same time keep 
the ally in some doubt about its loyalty in order to hold the ally in check.”21 Being too tough to 
an adversary can galvanize the protected state into going too far. In the support versus conciliate 
dilemma, “too much accommodation of the adversary may alienate the ally. Conversely, too 
much alliance solidarity might ruin a possible accord with the opponent… or even provoke it to 
attack.”22 Without dissolving the alliance, a county’s leaders can never totally eliminate the risk 
that their foreign friends will draw them into an unwanted conflict.23 It is exactly the purpose of 
extended deterrence, after all, to entangle oneself in an ally’s security interests.24 
                                                
19 Osgood, Alliances, 7-8. 
20 “To discourage the ally from defecting, one is constrained to frame one’s own policy, to some extent, to suit the 
ally’s interests… Rigidity of policy in a multipolar system may lead to entrapment in a war over the ally’s interests. 
Reducing this danger requires avoiding excessively tight commitments, but such avoidance risks abandonment by a 
dissatisfied ally. This is the ‘alliance security dilemma.’ ” Snyder, 19-20. 
21 Ibid., 196. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Snyder cites an evocative passage by French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré’s—his own formulation of the 
composite security dilemma. He addresses each the four imperatives of the dilemma: conciliating the adversary, 
deterring the adversary, avoiding abandonment, and avoiding entrapment. “On us rested two duties, difficult to 
reconcile but equally sacred: to do our utmost to prevent a conflict, and to do our utmost in order that, should it burst 
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Several scholars have suggested ways policymakers shape alliance relations for the 
purpose of restraint, as well as when restraint will be successful. All of their explanations revolve 
around the idea of bargaining power or leverage. Some believe the more powerful state tends to 
get its way in asymmetric alliances.25 Pressman notes that statesmen since Thucydides have 
believed ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.’26 James D. Morrow 
writes that “[b]efore the larger protector is willing to extend that commitment, it demands some 
control over the behavior of the smaller state to reduce the possibility of entrapment.”27 
According to Kim, “the likely victims of military entrapment (that is, suppliers of military 
protection) have a good chance of resisting entrapment exactly because they are more powerful 
than the lesser allies.”28 When a state fears entrapment and has strong bargaining power, it is 
likely to impose conditions and limits on its alliance obligations.29 The United States, especially, 
is more likely to entrap its allies than they are to entrap it.30 Lake also argues how close the 
relationship approximates anarchy, at one extreme, or empire, at the other, determines whether 
subordinate allies can act opportunistically towards dominant partners.31 As the asymmetry 
increases, the fewer “rights of residual control” are left to the protectorate.32 While Snyder 
suggests that alliances “tend to be dominated by the stronger member” because it is usually the 
                                                                                                                                                       
forth in spite of us, we should be prepared. And there were still two other duties which, also, at times ran the risk of 
being mutually contradictory: not to break up an alliance on which French policy has been based for a quarter of a 
century and the break-up of which would leave us in isolation at the mercy of our rivals; and nevertheless to do what 
lay in our power to induce our ally to exercise moderation in matters in which we are much less directly concerned 
than herself.” Cited in ibid., 329. 
24 Ibid., 358. Says Kim, “Alliance agreements increase the cost of non-involvement and make it rational for self-
interested states to become entangled into undesirable situations.” Kim, 356. 
25 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 169-170. 
26 Pressman, 2. 
27 James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 79. 
28 Kim, 353. 
29 Ibid., 358-9. 
30 Ibid., 377. 
31 Lake, 14-15. 
32 “In anarchic relations, ceteris paribus, the probability that the partner will behave opportunistically is 
comparatively high. In an empire, at the other extreme, states merge their formerly autonomous decision-making 
process and transfer rights of residual control to the dominant member.” Ibid., 14. 
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least dependent on the alliance for its security,33 he and Robert Jervis have also admitted weak 
states may actually enjoy bargaining power because of their vulnerability.34 Pressman, for his 
part, argues the success of restraint has more to do with the willingness of the powerful ally to 
“mobilize” its superior resources.35 
 The essence of bargaining leverage is the existence of alternatives. George Liska mused 
that the “task of restraining is made easier when the commitment is not automatic.”36 Cha, as 
well, observes that “the large power’s successful control will also hinge on complex bargaining 
and leverage dynamics that emerge within the alliance.”37 A lack of substitutes may create an 
absolute commitment. Thus, “if patron A makes commitments to B such that B knows that 
patron A is ‘locked in’ (i.e., unconditionally obligated to intervene on B’s behalf), then control 
may fail because bargaining leverage effectively shifts to B.”38 
 The mechanism and norm of consultation also serves as an entrée into an ally’s 
decisionmaking loops.39 As Liska discusses, “[t]he major ally wishes to be consulted chiefly in 
order to have the opportunity to authorize or veto action, or to be able to dissociate himself from 
the inception, implementation, and consequences of a lesser ally’s conduct.”40 Participation and 
                                                
33 Snyder, 12, 31. 
34 “But a weak state, although it has an interest in the continued existence of its stronger partner, may have no 
interest in acting to preserve it, if the ally is strong enough to defend itself. Therefore, the strong state cannot 
credibly threaten to withhold support, whereas the weak state can do so.” Ibid., 170. Again: “On grounds of 
credibility, it is likely to be easier to restrain a strong ally than a weak one. It is credible to threaten nonsupport of a 
strong ally if the ally can defend itself. Obviously, this is not credible vis-à-vis a weak ally. The vulnerability of the 
weak ally gives it bargaining leverage in another way: it can more credibly threaten to realign with the enemy than if 
it were capable of its own defense.” Ibid., 326. 
35 The success of mobilizing power resources in turn depends on (1) deception of the restrainer by the restrainee, (2) 
unified leadership in the restrainer, (3) hierarchy of national security objectives between allies, and (4) the creation 
of an alternate pathway for the restrainee. Pressman, 14-15. 
36 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 
36. For example, “Prussia under Bismarck retained his alternative option in the target-state (Russia) to check the ally 
[Austria]; and to make up for a strict interpretation of the defense commitment… [but the] prerequisites of effective 
restrain collapsed when post-Bismarckian Germany threw up the Russian option.” Ibid., 35. 
37 Cha, 195. 
38 Ibid., footnotes. 
39 Snyder, 13. 
40 Liska, 74. 
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intervention in an ally’s decisionmaking may extend beyond a veto into the formulation of policy 
itself.41 The more serious the commitment, the deeper a guarantor state will want consultation.42  
 Snyder provides a useful list of the many methods of restraint scholars have identified. 
States can (1) “threaten defection;” (2) “withhold diplomatic support… in a particular dispute;” 
(3) “insist on consultation;” (4) “urg[e] the ally to make concessions;” (5) use “reassurance;” (6) 
“point out that the alliance is defensive only;” and (7) “say that certain minor interests of the ally 
are not ‘worth’ a war.”43 But he continues that “[t]he credibility of restraining threats will also be 
affected by the restrainer’s degree of commitment to the alliance.”44 This key point, which most 
have at least acknowledged, has nevertheless been underappreciated for US alliances. America’s 
style of extended deterrence is unprecedented in the modern history of sovereign states. The 
absolute character of its commitments severely constrains its ability to employ the first and 
traditionally most important method of restraint: threatening abandonment or nonsupport for a 
risk-prone ally. Such threats are simply not credible in the American system of forward 
deployments. 
 
Forward deployments and automaticity in post-WWII American alliances 
Making a commitment credible is all about sending signals to adversaries and allies. 
Morrow, for example, points out it is necessary to prove commitments are credible because 
international anarchy provides no ultimate assurances: No sovereign of sovereigns imposes 
                                                
41 “To be meaningful, participation in consultations must not stop with the right (and duty) to approve the policies of 
the major ally or allies. The range of participation must extend to formulation and implementation of alliance 
policy.” Ibid., 73. 
42 “The scope of consultation depends on the immediate needs and conveniences of allies; but these in turn reflect 
the tendency of an alliance to be ‘limited’ or ‘total’ in terms of the degree of liability that allies commonly assume 
for each other’s actions and interests.” Ibid., 75. 
43 Snyder, 322-324. 
44 Ibid., 327 
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direct repercussions when a state fails to fulfill a contractual agreement. Thus, “the existence of 
credibility as an issue implies that states cannot predict one another’s actions. States considering 
the use of force cannot know whether their target’s allies will come to its aid.”45 To be 
persuasive, signaling must create a cost of some kind. Otherwise, “[i]f there were a signal that 
would always deter others by convincing them of the willingness of allies to come to one 
another’s aid, then even states that had no intention of aiding their allies would wish to send that 
signal.”46 As James D. Fearson mentions, states confront this credibility problem when they want 
to “convey to other states what are one's ‘vital interests,’ which are precisely those interests over 
which a state is willing to fight if challenged.”47 A commitment requires the visible sacrifice of 
some highly valued goal or resource as a reflection of the value the state places on its ally’s 
security. 
 There are multiple ways allies can send costly signals, but Fearson identifies two broad 
categories: A state can either “sink costs” or “tie its hands.” Whereas sunk-cost signals “are 
costly for the state to take in the first place but do not affect the relative value of fighting versus 
acquiescing in a challenge,” tying hands involves “staking an action that increases the costs of 
backing down if the would-be challenger actually challenges but otherwise entails no costs if no 
challenge materializes.”48 Tying one’s hands creates domestic or international “audience costs,” 
such that if it fails to fulfill its obligations, the protector state will face challenges to its prestige 
and governing officials will face political pressure from voters and other domestic power 
groups.49 
                                                
45 Morrow, 68. Also see Snyder, 325. 
46 “Separation of types requires that sending the signal entails a cost.” Ibid., 68-69. 
47 James D. Fearson, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 41:1 (1997): 69. 
48 Fearson, 70. 
49 Morrow, 71. 
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 Beyond creating audience costs, the most important element in the tying hands approach 
is the elimination of the alternative options, like abandonment, that one might rationally consider 
in a military crisis. In the definitive work on commitment, Thomas C. Schelling reminds us that 
persuading others of our willingness to fight often requires “having those intentions, even 
deliberately acquiring them.”50 The commitment process here entails a differentiation between a 
current self and a future self, with the former locking in the behavior of the latter when he might 
have strong temptations to act otherwise. Or, perhaps more accurately, when there is domestic 
dissension over alliance decisions, certain officials remove the escape routes their opponents 
would use during a crisis. “The process of surrendering and destroying options that we might 
have been expected to find too attractive in an emergency” leaves only one possible option.51 
Otherwise, “if the commitment is ill defined and ambiguous—if we leave ourselves loopholes 
through which to exit—our opponent will expect us to be under strong temptation to make a 
graceful exit (or even a somewhat graceless one) and he may be right.”52 Deterrence is bolstered 
when the adversary believes a state has no choice but to do what it says it is going to do—that it 
cannot fail to act.53 
                                                
50 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 36, 43-44. On the 
decision to establish a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan: “We were not merely communicating an intention or 
obligation we already had, but actually enhancing the obligation in the process. The congressional message was not, 
‘Since we are obliged to defend Formosa, we may as well show it.’ Rather: ‘In case we were not sufficiently 
committed to impress you, now we are. We hereby oblige ourselves. Behold us in the public ritual of getting 
ourselves genuinely committed.’ ” Ibid., 50. 
51 Schelling, 44. 
52 Ibid., 47-48. 
53 “If commitments could be undone by declaration they would be worthless in the first place. The whole purpose of 
verbal or ritualistic commitments, of political and diplomatic commitments, of efforts to attach honor and reputation 
to a commitment, is to make the commitment manifestly hard to get out of on short notice. Even the commitments 
not deliberately incurred, and the commitments that embarrass one in unforeseen circumstances, cannot be undone 
cheaply.” Ibid., 66. 
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 Choosing to bind oneself to a certain line of action is closely related to the “rationality of 
irrationality.”54 In Schelling’s words, a “paradox of deterrence is that it does not always help to 
be, or to be believed to be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of oneself or of one’s 
country.”55 According to his White House Chief of Staff, Richard Nixon had an explicit 
“madman theory” of diplomacy,56 and Niccolò Machiavelli once advised that it may be “a very 
wise thing to simulate craziness at the right time.”57 Lawrence Freedman writes that in nuclear 
deterrence, “choice could be wholly conceded… by making the threatened action automatic, 
beyond recall unless stopped by an act of compliance…. pass a line and nothing could be done to 
stop the denotation and the shared calamity.”58 This doomsday device was the inspiration for 
Stanley Kubrick’s film Dr. Strangelove, but the technique extends to conventional deterrence as 
well. As Freedman explains, “[t]here were some precedents: the Greeks burning their bridges to 
show they would stand and fight against the Persians; the Spanish conqueror Cortez 
conspicuously burning his ships in front of the Aztecs.”59 In his The Art of War commentary, for 
example, Du Mu interprets Sun Tzu to say that “[w]hen your army has crossed the border, you 
should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no 
hankering after home.”60 If we again take every IR scholar’s favorite analogy, the game of 
                                                
54 Lawrence Freedman, “Rationality of Irrationality,” In Strategy: A History, 156-177 (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
55 Schelling, 37. 
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59 Ibid. 
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chicken, it is the equivalent of cutting the brake line and throwing away the steering wheel.61 The 
purpose is to publicly demonstrate you have removed the option of withdrawal. 
 This discussion is critical for an explanation of US deterrence strategy because America’s 
style of alliance is distinctly different from the European modal that preceded it. At the close of 
the Second World War, American officials were convinced that informal commitments to defend 
Western Europe against Russian invasion would not believed. Instead, the United States would 
establish formal alliances in peacetime and occupy the territory of its allies. Without these 
mechanisms, they assumed, stated US intentions would not be credible. Osgood explains why:  
[I]n light of the isolationist history of the United States and the conviction that a firm advance commitment 
to the defense of Europe was essential to avoid another world war with belated American intervention, that 
members of the Brussels pact and the Truman-Acheson administration believed that a formal alliance was 
essential to establish a credible American pledge of military assistance.62 
 
Likewise, Fearson writes that “[t]he costly US investment in NATO is… one where the 
justification for permanently stationing troops in Europe rested in part on the idea that the 
domestic and international audience costs created by an alliance treaty alone would not have 
convincingly committed the United States to fight.”63 Here he is talking about Western Europe, 
but ensuring credibility was just as vital in East Asia. Washington felt compelled to strike up 
alliances in the Pacific, Cha reasons, because “[a]mbivalence toward making major military 
commitments in Asia was a hallmark of the United States’ global strategy before World War 
II.”64 As Schelling opined, “[t]o have told the Soviets in the late 1940s that, if they attacked, we 
were obliged to defend Europe [or Asia, for that matter] might not have been wholly 
convincing.”65 “American demonstrations of intent, peacetime maneuvers, and conspicuous 
                                                
61 Steven Chan, China, The U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 
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62 Osgood, Alliances, 42. 
63 Fearson, 87. 
64 Cha, 167. 
65 Schelling, 47. 
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preparations for airlift,” Osgood wrote, “may not adequately compensate for the psychological 
disadvantage, in terms of possible provocation as well as loss of credibility, of having to move 
forces to a point of danger rather than having American forces already in the area.” It would be 
an “agonizing decision for the President of the United States to move forces to the scene of a 
crisis,” and America’s allies “cannot count on forces stationed in the United States being 
earmarked for assistance to them in a time of competing needs.”66 
Ever since, the keystone of extended deterrence has been “tripwire” garrisons of 
American troops. US overseas deployments are partly for the purpose of access and the 
extension of power projection, but their main function is the absolute guarantee.67 Schelling 
argued that “[t]he difference between the national homeland and everything ‘abroad’ is the 
difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and the threats that 
have to be made credible.”68 Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has 
therefore tried to convince its friends, its enemies, and itself that it considers allied territory to be 
as inviolable as its own—just as worth fighting and dying to protect. When a despairing skeptic 
or hopeful opportunist has asked the US government whether it is really willing to trade New 
York for Hamburg,69 or Los Angeles for Taipei,70 the response is a resounding yes, even if the 
speaker is not actually certain of the answer himself. America stations soldiers abroad so it does 
not have to decide when the time comes. The choice has already been made. Schelling writes that 
“[n]otions like ‘trip wire’ or ‘plate glass window,’ though oversimplified, were attempts to 
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67 Ibid., 92. 
68 Schelling, 36. 
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express this role. And while ‘trip wire’ is a belittling term to describe an army, the role is not a 
demeaning one.”71 
The positioning of large numbers of American troops in Berlin, West Germany, South 
Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and elsewhere is not so dissimilar to Kubrick’s doomsday device. The key 
element is automaticity. American commitments may not require an immediate military response 
legally, but forward deployments guarantee involvement in fact.72 Technically speaking, “there 
was no automatic commitment, because the treaty left to each party the right to decide when an 
armed attack had taken place,” but the “quality of automaticity was greatly reinforced later by 
the stationing of American ground forces in Europe and by the integration of the defenses of 
parties in the North Atlantic Treaty.”73 In a more modern example, the Defense Department’s 
(DoD) 1995 Nye Report states, “our treaty commitment and the presence of United States troops 
in South Korea help deter any North Korean aggression by making it unmistakably clear that the 
United States would automatically and immediately be involved in any such conflict.”74 
Automaticity does not even require a garrison force strong enough to defend itself. According to 
Samuel P. Huntington, military forces “may deter simply by being in place and thus increasing 
the uncertainties and potential costs to an aggressor, even though they could not mount an 
effective defense. Allied forces in Berlin have performed this role for years.”75 In a more 
gruesome but probably more candid expression, Schelling argued the Berlin garrison in 
particular was never meant to defeat a superior Red Army in combat: “What can 7,000 American 
                                                
71 Schelling, 47. 
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troops do, or 12,000 Allied troops? Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, 
and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there.”76 By “leav[ing] the Soviet 
Union in no doubt that the United States would be automatically involved in the event of any 
attack on Europe,” the sacrifice of “more troops being run over by the Soviet Army than we 
could afford to see defeated” ensured American deterrence in Germany, as well as East Asia.77 
But while this may be desirable for assuaging allies’ fears of abandonment and 
adversaries’ hopes for US noninvolvement, it has also stripped alliance managers of their 
primary method of inducing restraint. So long as the removal of American troops from allied soil 
is not on the table, threats of defection lack any coherent bargaining leverage. Making the 
abandonment of an ally in a crisis impossible is the point, after all, of the strategy of 
automaticity. This means that in the post-WWII era, alliances have witnessed “several 
developments that have reduced their flexibility,” such as “their primarily deterrent function” 
and “the increased importance of peacetime military forces.”78 The “consequence of these new 
constraints… is that intra-alliance functions have assumed greater importance.”79 
Others have not put as much emphasis on this, partly because scholars like Snyder 
focused on European alliances in the pre-World War I era.80 Because US negotiators have had 
little bargaining power over the ultimate question of the alliance, however, a different model of 
restraint must apply to post-WWII American alliances. As I explain in the theory section, it is 
concerned with burdensharing. 
                                                
76 Schelling, 47. 
77 “They represent the pride, the honor, and the reputation of the United States government and its armed forces; and 
they can apparently hold the entire Red Army at bay.” Ibid. 
78 Osgood, Alliances, 30-31. 
79 Ibid., 34. 
80 Snyder’s definition of commitment is a better fit for a different historical epoch: “Existing analyses define 
[commitment], alternatively or simultaneously, as a physical act or move that forecloses all options but one, or as an 
arrangement of values that favors one option over the others, or as an obligation to fulfill a promise. I choose to 
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Economic (rather than strategic) explanations of alliance burdensharing  
Studies of alliance burdensharing tend to wear an economic rather than a strategic lens. 
They begin by assuming the United States prefers to pay as little as possible towards the “public 
good” of security, and they lament the ‘freeriding problem’ in American alliances. In Mancur 
Olson and Richard Zeckhauser’s model,81 any member of the alliance would like to freeride off 
the balancing efforts of its partners. Doing so might be feasible because 
(1) if the common goal is achieved, everyone who shares this goal automatically benefits, or, in other 
words, nonpurchasers cannot be kept from consuming the good, and (2) if the good is available to any one 
person in a group, it is or can be made available to the other members of the group at little or no marginal 
cost.82 
 
The reality, however, is US allies piggyback off American commitments, not the other way 
around.83 Because they cannot exclude smaller members from enjoying the security the alliance 
provides, there is a tendency for larger members in asymmetric alliances to pay proportionally 
more than their fair share.84 In 1968, Osgood bemoaned the fact that “[t]wo decades after a war 
from which [Western Europeans] have long since recovered economically, they show few signs 
of fulfilling the original postwar expectation that they would assume the major burden of their 
own defense in return for an American guarantee.”85 Likewise, according to Huntington’s 
estimates, in 1985 the US was responsible for more than 70% of total defense spending and 40% 
                                                
81 Olson and Zeckhauser were trying to explain a perplexing empirical anomaly: “The European members of NATO 
are much nearer the front line than the United States, and they are less able to defend themselves alone. Thus, it 
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World, ed. Francis A. Beer (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 122. 
82 Ibid., 122-123. 
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84 Lake writes that hierarchical alliance relationships encourage freeriding: “The shift of residual control from one 
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Lake, 17. Snyder also argues that “the logic of collective goods undercuts the balance of power theory, however. 
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85 Osgood, Alliances, 8. 
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of total personnel between NATO and Japan, despite having only 47.5% of the total GDP and 
less than one-third of the total allied population.86 In other words, the US may have been 
spending more on the defense of Western Europe than Western Europe was paying itself, and 
American figures for East Asia were twice as large as Japan’s.87 
Olson and others do mention what they mean by a “larger” member depends in part on 
the different strategic valuations. Whoever “place[s] a higher absolute value on the public 
good… [will] bear a disproportionate share of the burden” because it lacks credible bargaining 
power.88 This player has usually been Washington in the post-World War II era. As soon as the 
alliance treaty is signed, “the larger powers are immediately deprived of their strongest 
bargaining weapon—the threat that they will not help to defend the recalcitrant smaller powers—
in any negotiations about the sharing of the common burden,” especially because US “alliances 
are often involved in situations that contain a strong element of irreversibility.”89 For very 
asymmetric alliances, moreover, any success in getting small allies to increase their share of the 
collective burden is likely to not be worth the effort, since “it would expect only a relatively 
small addition to the alliance force from the small nation.”90 
 Olson and Snyder offer two scenarios in which the freeriding problem may be overcome. 
First, Olson mentions a “special case” to his general theory of burdensharing: “During periods of 
all-out war or exceptional insecurity, it is likely that defense is (or is nearly) a superior good, and 
in such circumstances alliances will not have any tendency toward disproportionate burden 
sharing.”91 Given extreme danger, “the more concerned nation would not only put a higher 
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valuation on the alliance’s military capacity, but would bear a share of the total alliance costs 
that was even greater than its share of the total benefits.”92 Snyder likewise argues, “although the 
collective goods logic prevails early in an aggressor’s career, the balance of power eventually 
triumphs.”93 Second, an explicit distancing strategy may foster enough fear in an allied state for 
it to increase indigenous defense spending. States will hedge when abandonment is a serious 
possibility. Thus, “a decline in amity, unity, and community of interest among allies” tends to 
produce a “greater ratio of private to collective benefits.”94  
 All of this analysis, however, works within a paradigm that assumes states wish to pay at 
little as possible. The practical application of this research, which has been adopted as a central 
tenet by many neoclassical realists,95 is that the United States should distance itself from its allies 
to stop freeriding. As I argue, however, there are critical strategic reasons for not thinking of 
freeriding as problem. For decades, in fact, American officials have explicitly or implicitly 
discouraged the growth of allied military expenditure. 
 
Theory 
My theory, simply, is that burdensharing affects alliance restraint. In asymmetric 
alliances, especially post-WWII US alliances in which extended deterrence has been guaranteed 
by the deployment of significant forces on allied territory, officials confront a ‘burdensharing 
dilemma.’ There is a tradeoff between how much collective burden a protectorate carries and 
how much control over entrapment the protector can exert. For the sake of bolstering collective 
deterrence and relieving immense financial burdens, alliance managers have wanted allies to 
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assume a more proactive security posture. However, they have not wanted the growth of 
independent power to reduce Washington’s ability to restrain. Policymakers condition alliance 
policy with reference to fearing a loss of control. At different times, and often simultaneously, 
Americans have wanted their allies to be both strong and weak. 
 There have been hints of this dilemma in the political science literature, but there has 
been no systematic exploration and refinement of the theory. A connection to how automatic 
commitments either create or exacerbate the burdensharing dilemma has also been lacking. Sun 
Tzu, for example, might also be read to warn against bolstering other power groups, even allies, 
in an imperial system: “Do not cultivate balance in all-under-heaven.”96 Liska mentions that 
when trying to restrain one another, allies worry about each other’s relative strength.97 Because 
“the patterns of roles and claims within an alliance will change with the rise and decline of 
national capabilities,” “[u]nequal gains arouse fears… lest [the rising state] impose his conflict as 
the dominant issue for the alliance as a whole.”98 Timothy W. Crawford remarks that “pivotal 
deterrence is more likely to succeed the more the military balance favors the pivot [the protector 
state] over the adversaries [the protectorate and the enemy].”99 Olson and Zeckhauser write in a 
footnote that in some scenarios, allied “nations may make policy concessions in order to get 
other members to assume a greater share of alliance costs.”100 
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 The post-World War II era offers numerous instances of American policymakers fearing 
the potential application of allied military power. Cha, for example, notes that despite wanting to 
arm Taiwan for the sake of deterrence, the US was often more worried in the early Cold War 
about restraining Taiwan’s ability for independent action.101 This manifested in limitations and 
conditions placed on arms shipments.102 American officials similarly worried about South 
Korea’s possession of an autonomous capacity for warfighting.103 
A few scholars have actually acknowledged the burdensharing dilemma in American 
alliances but have explored neither the concept nor cases in great detail. Chalmers Johnson 
exposes the tradeoff without really understanding it as a tradeoff, instead chalking up the 
apparent anomaly to strategic incoherence: “the United States has long pushed Japan to build up 
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the United States. Later, when the U.S. military withdrew four divisions from the Korean Peninsula following the 
declaration of a ceasefire, the question arose as to how much equipment the United States would leave behind as 
part of South Korea’s military modernization program. The Koreans wanted it all, but Secretary of Defense Charles 
Wilson bluntly stated: ‘Well, we will try to argue out what we think you need, what we think we can let you have, 
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exactly the same military power it is supposed to be containing.”104 Peter Liberman recognizes 
the twin goals of American alliance policy, burdensharing and control: “Primacy and 
nonproliferation goals would be compromised by Germany and Japanese renationalization [of 
military power and policy], however gradual. U.S. interests in greater allied contributions…, 
however, have softened U.S. opposition.”105 Osgood also alludes to the tension,106 mentioning 
containment of communism and containment of allies in the same breath.107 David S. Yost 
mentions a “problem” which for him seems solvable: “One of the main challenges for U.S. 
officials will be to find ways to persuade America's allies to accept more defense burdens 
without a correspondingly great decrease in U.S. influence in alliance policymaking.”108 Richard 
N. Haass has claimed that the US should encourage allies to rearm, but only so much and only 
under American guidance.109 Thomas J. Christensen has twice identified a dilemma between the 
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“somewhat contradictory goals” of greater burdensharing and the US role as a “regional 
stabilizer.”110 He writes, “All things being equal, alliance leaders… would have liked their 
weaker allies to shoulder a good bit of the alliance burden. On the other hand, they would have 
liked the allies to respect and follow the alliance leader’s general line.” The main obstacle to this 
is “[a]n ally’s increased independence reduces the ability of its partners to restrain it and thereby 
increases the risk of entrapment for those partners if the maverick ally behaves in belligerent 
ways.”111 
 The burdensharing dilemma essentially poses two ideal types or choices. A protector 
state can either accept a low level of burdensharing in return for a high level of control, or it can 
accept a high level of burdensharing with a low level of control. The key is that as burdensharing 
increases within an asymmetric alliance, especially one where unilateral commitments are 
guaranteed by the basing of US troops, there are inherent tendencies towards a loss of control 
over the risk of entrapment. 
 For most of the post-WWII history of Americans alliances, policymakers have tried to 
not choose between the options the burdensharing dilemma offers. They have grabbed both horns 
of the dilemma rather than one. To some extent, they succeeded by adopting methods like a 
division of roles instead of just a division of labor, deep norms and mechanisms of consultation, 
and a level of operational control over allied militaries that is difficult to reconcile with liberal 
                                                                                                                                                       
disproportionate one—for what we do in the world, but that price is still affordable in the current context, modest by 
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notions of international equality and sovereignty.112 Nevertheless, the high burdensharing-high 
control option is not a stable equilibrium; it is no equilibrium at all. When a protectorate 
significantly increases the share of the collective burden it carries, it will demand more control 
over its own units and a greater degree of independence from its protector. Inevitably, the allied 
military will be mainly used for the national purposes of the ally itself, not its guarantor. 
When America has tried to restraint its allies, it has been concerned with two distinct but 
intertwined types of entrapment: ‘tactical entrapment’ and ‘strategic entrapment.’ Tactical 
entrapment refers to the physical ability of an ally to use its military capabilities to start a war. 
Elements include offensive military capabilities and doctrines that are involved in actual military 
operations. Like tactical entrapment, strategic entrapment is concerned with the growth of an 
ally’s independent power, but it is more about system effects. Americans consistently feared that 
the growth of Japanese or German power would upset regional collective security—sparking 
arms races and destabilizing security competitions. These effects would be beyond American 
control and could start wars to which the US was obligated. 
 
Methods and scope 
This thesis is more an exercise in policy studies than in social science, and more a theory 
of foreign policy than a theory of international relations. I am more concerned with American 
policymaking and strategic thinking than that of American allies, although the latter will 
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undoubtedly come out in the following chapters. My case study method is better than a 
quantitative method for this effort. Strategy is understood intuitively and qualitatively, and there 
are a limited number of relevant cases, making statistical analysis less meaningful. For a first 
attempt at a theory creation, case studies better illustrate the logic and importance of a model. 
For my two cases, I have chosen the US-Japan alliance during the Cold War and the US-
Japan alliance during the Rebalance to Asia. There are several reasons why. First, Japan is as 
intrinsically important a case in Asia as West Germany was in Europe. Second, in line with 
Mill’s method of difference, the two cases have practically everything in common save 
burdensharing. In the bipolar Cold War, the United States accepted a low level of burdensharing 
from Japan in return for the maintenance of control, while in the Pivot to Asia, the reality of 
economic multipolarity is forcing the United States to accept a higher level of burdensharing and 
a greater risk of entrapment. Third, the case is the most relevant and of greatest interest to current 
and future policymakers who must grapple with a US-Japan alliance that is visibly and rapidly 
undergoing fundamental changes in response to the rise of China. 
Presumably, my theory is applicable to any alliance relationship in which forward 
deployments ensure the automatic involvement of the United States in its allies’ wars. Cold War 
cases include South Korea, Taiwan until the termination of the Mutual Security Treaty in 1980, 
the Philippines until the expulsion of the Seventh Fleet in 1991, and West Germany until the fall 
of the Soviet Union. Today, South Korea and Japan are obviously applicable. With new small 
deployments being planned for the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, and possibly Vietnam 
today, there is also the distinct possibility that the United States is skipping the stage of 
dominance and jumping straight to the stage of commitment without control. My theory may 
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also be relevant to alliance or alignment cases without physically assured commitment that 
nevertheless near guarantees, but the cases I consider are more clear-cut.  
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Chapter 3: Burdensharing in the Cold War 
 
Introduction 
Burdensharing was a point of contention in US-Japan alliance management throughout 
the Cold War. The most common narrative is a simplistic picture of disagreement between 
America and Japan. With “the one weary, the other wary,” the United States repeatedly asked 
Japan to do more, and Japan opposed sinking any further costs.113 Yet, the US approach to 
Japanese burdensharing was hardly monolithic. Such analysis masks the complexity of 
Washington’s objectives. US attitudes towards Japanese rearmament actually revolved around 
two competing concerns. On the one hand, American officials wanted Japan to play a greater 
role in both cold and hot wars against Communism in Asia. On the other, many feared the 
revival of Japanese military power would cause instability both within and without the Asian 
‘Free World’ and that the US would be unable to control independent Japanese power.114 
As a general rule, the imperative of collective defense (i.e. lifting up Japan) often won out 
over the imperative of collective security (i.e. suppressing Japan). This can be attributed partly to 
a compromise gradually accepted between US demands and Japanese opposition. The fact of 
Japanese opposition was important in itself, since it probably dampened concerns in the US that 
Japan was interested in becoming a great power. Also critical was the fact that Japanese territory 
rarely came under direct military threat for the duration of the Cold War, making genuine 
scenarios of tactical entrapment unlikely. However, the evidence shows that voices fearful of 
unleashing Japanese power persisted within high circles for most of the period. Concerns over 
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both meanings of burdensharing—greater collective defense and instability and loss of control—
often existed simultaneously within the minds of the same policymakers. At different times, 
trepidation at Japanese power successfully countered desire of it. The influence of the strategic 
entrapment fear can be seen even when the US did convince Japan to rearm, since Americans did 
their best to establish mechanisms of control over Japanese defense decisionmaking and 
rolesharing. 
 The new picture that emerges is one of US support for Japanese rearmament in times 
when a belief that it could be controlled predominated, much greater caution when beliefs that 
American control could slip gained ascendency—as well as the manipulation of Japanese 
military structures to facilitate control. 
 
The End of WWII and the Early Cold War 
As with Germany, US plans for Japan in the postwar era originally aimed at ensuring 
Japan would never again threaten Asia or the United States. Many American policymakers 
welcomed Japan’s annihilation. In May 1943, one Navy Department official argued, “Japan 
should be bombed so that there was little left of its civilization, so that the country could not 
begin to recuperate fifty years.”115 The special adviser to the Secretary of State agreed, stating in 
December that “[i]t would be quite possible for us to let the Japanese nation disappear.”116 
Although couched in less extreme terms, all policy documents prior to and immediately 
following the Japanese surrender were based on the principle of Japan’s total demilitarization. 
The August 29, 1945 Initial Post-Surrender Policy Directive for Japan, for example, stated in no 
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uncertain terms that “[d]isarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military 
occupation” and forbid the existence of any Japanese military, police, or even civil aviation 
capacity.117 A June 11 draft of the document envisioned the “creation of conditions that will 
insure [sic] that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.”118 
There was a general consensus that US annexation of Okinawa would help prevent the 
resurgence of Japanese militarism.119 As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), 
Douglas MacArthur was the foremost proponent of this line of thinking. His February 1946 
guidance for the new constitution ordered the renunciation of Japan’s right to make war and 
maintain armed forces “even for preserving its own security.”120 
With the coming of the Cold War, prompted in particular by the Korean War, American 
policy towards Japan began a great “Reverse Course.” The demilitarization regime, or what 
Victor Cha has called the ‘alpha option,’ was gradually rejected because, in essence, it meant 
Japan could not help kill Communists in the Far East.121 In fact, anticipating America’s global 
struggle with the Soviet Union after the fall of Japan, US officers almost immediately began 
setting the foundations for new Japanese naval and intelligence organizations, without the 
knowledge of either MacArthur or Washington.122 Lieutenant-General Robert Eichelberger, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, most senior members of the Pentagon, many in the State Department, and 
Newsweek editor Harry Kern became enthusiastic supporters of strengthening the military of 
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America’s new protectorate.123 If the United States wanted to defend Western Europe and the 
Western Pacific from further Communist advances, imperial Germany and Japan would have to 
be resurrected, albeit under American tutelage.124 With Japan rearmed, Eichelberger argued in 
1948, Russia would have to divide its forces between Europe and Asia.125 In May 1947, 
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson demanded that “the greatest workshops of Europe and 
Asia, Germany and Japan,” be put back to work.126 Then in April 1950, he and State Department 
Policy Planning Director Paul Nitze wrote in NSC-68 that containment required “creating global 
‘situations of strength.’ ”127 The irony of this position was not lost on Navy Secretary James 
Forrestal. He told President Truman that defeating Communism necessitated the rebirth of 
Germany and Japan, “the two countries we have just destroyed.”128 By the time of the Korean 
War, MacArthur’s demilitarization campaign had been thoroughly revised. The Japanese 
Constitution now only renounced the threat or use of force “as a means of settling disputes.”129 
The United States hoped to eventually offload many of its regional responsibilities on Japan, 
especially in the Korean Peninsula.130  
Yet even then, many American officials, themselves recently a target, were aware that 
promoting full-scale Japanese rearmament entailed certain costs. They had significant 
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reservations about the ‘gamma option’ because the prospect of a remilitarized Japan deeply 
unsettled its neighbors.131 In 1951, John Foster Dulles proposed to Australia, New Zealand, and 
other Asian governments the idea of rearming Japan and creating a Pacific Pact similar to 
NATO. According to US diplomat John Allison, Australian Foreign Minister Percy Spender 
became so infuriated he looked like he “would burst a blood vessel.”132 The Philippines and New 
Zealand voiced similar anxieties over the lack of controls on Japanese military adventurism.133 
George Kennan became particularly wary of significant Japanese rearmament over time. Dulles, 
the future Secretary of State under the Dwight Eisenhower administration, eventually came 
around to a view more similar to MacArthur than the Joint Chiefs, saying in 1952 that Japan “has 
a unique capacity for good or evil” and has “historically been susceptible to militarism.”134 The 
DoD’s plans to turn Japan into a “major offensive air base,” he believed, could result in 
“overmilitarization,” which was not in America’s interest.135 
Knowledge of these dangers, as well as strong opposition from the conservative Japanese 
government, resulted in a strategy that was a rough compromise between competing objectives. 
“Emerging between the alpha and gamma options,” Cha notes, “the beta option sought to create 
a postwar Japan that was not too weak but not too strong.”136 Convinced by Dulles, Secretary of 
State Acheson and Defense Secretary George Marshall told the president that the nascent US-
Japan alliance served a dual purpose: “assuring combined action as between the members to 
resist aggression from without and also to resist attack by one of the members, e.g. Japan, if 
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Japan should again become aggressive.”137 American policymakers continued to press their ally 
for greater contributions to collective defense and express frustration at its freeriding. Chief of 
the SCAP Economic and Scientific Bureau Major General William Marquat’s suggested the US 
rely on Japan more as a production center for armaments and less as a supplier of troops. His 
views gradually gained favor.138 In the short run, at least, Americans found enough satisfaction 
with Japan’s contributions of war materiel and acquiescence in hosting US military bases for the 
relationship to continue.  
The Japanese government was satisfied as well given the limited incentives it faced to 
spend more on its own defense. Few thought a Soviet or Chinese attack on Japanese territory at 
all likely. They lacked the expeditionary capacity, for one, and Dean Acheson had already 
announced in January 1950 that Japan fell within the US defense perimeter. It mattered little that 
the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty signed in 1952 did not explicitly obligate the United 
States to come to Japan’s aid. Generals like Mathew Ridgway were already acting like it did. He 
wrote to the Army Department that the “most vital factor in the achievement of US objectives in 
the Orient is the continued maintenance of Japanese faith in our commitment to guarantee the 
essential security of Japan.”139 MacArthur himself had come to favor a “tripwire” strategy of 
American troops stationed in Japan.140 Yoshida Shigeru, the first postwar prime minister, 
certainly recognized this. He stated in 1951 that Japan did “not have the slightest expectation that 
the Communist countries will invade Japan.”141 Unworried by the failure of the US to offer a 
legal obligation to protect Japan, Yoshida “was satisfied that ‘if Japan were invaded while 
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United States forces were actually stationed in that country they could hardly adopt a neutral 
attitude.’ A written guarantee was therefore unnecessary.”142 
Washington exerted as much control as possible over the rearmament the alliance was 
successful in achieving, which was not insignificant. American officials repeatedly emphasized 
the defensive nature of the Japanese military buildup.143 While in private, US policymakers 
noted the tight connection between Southeast Asian trade missions and securing the raw 
materials for Japanese rearmament, in public they were “anxious not to overemphasize the 
rearmament procurement side of these plans… [which] could easily be misinterpreted as a U.S. 
conspiracy to revive Japanese leadership of a Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with the 
added drive of U.S. backing.”144 To reassure Asian allies that Washington retained what Kennan 
called “veto power” over Tokyo, American negotiators signed a number of bilateral alliance 
treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and other nations.145 A hub-and-spokes structure quickly 
came to characterize American alliance system in Asia, in part because of fears of resurgent 
Japanese aggression. Additionally, Dulles tried to convince Yoshida to place the Police Reserve 
and the future Self-Defense Forces under an American Supreme Commander, similar to the 
wartime Operational Control mechanism in place in the US-ROK alliance to this day.146 Luckily 
for Japanese uninterested in fighting other Asians, he was not successful. 
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From Korea to Vietnam 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, while Washington policymakers continued to vent their 
frustrations with Japanese interlocutors, they did so in a routine that became almost ritualistic. 
Americans’ reservations about the consequences of pushing too far balanced even this relatively 
unenthusiastic push for large-scale rearmament. Eisenhower had promised as a presidential 
candidate that from now on, Asians would fight Asian wars of freedom themselves. His ‘New 
Look’ strategy aimed to replace US ground troops with Japanese levies.147 On Yoshida’s last trip 
to Washington in November 1954, Dulles pleaded for Japan “to develop the spirit and strength to 
resume a place as one of the great nations of the world.”148 In a fit of exasperation, diplomat John 
Allison avowed in the same year that the Japanese had “no abstract sense of right or wrong.”149 
Far Eastern Command Chief of Staff General Carter Magruder, in an attempt to foster a “more 
aggressive spirit” in Japan, went so far as to suggest Washington tell Tokyo it “would view 
favorably the re-establishment of the Japanese Empire.”150 “It was difficult,” Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk had told President Lyndon Johnson in January 1964, “to draft boys from Kansas 
farms and Pittsburgh factories to send as riflemen to Japan which has a population of 95 million 
people.”151  
Yet throughout the period, and despite adamant protests from the US military, the 
majority view and the one held by Eisenhower himself was to look favorably on Japanese 
advancements to expand its military reach, while avoiding damaging the alliance by criticizing 
Tokyo too much.152 The president hoped for greater Japanese burdensharing when the 
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administration negotiated a Mutual Security Assistance Pact in 1952. Yet this would be limited 
to internal defense, since “to avoid frightening our other friends in the Pacific, we must always 
provide the naval and air strength required in that region by the free world.”153 Indeed, in June 
1961, American Military High Commissioner on Okinawa Lieutenant General Paul Caraway 
blocked a call for greater Japanese administrative control from a special commission headed by 
presidential assistant Carl Kaysen. He believed that since “Japan was wholly expansionist in the 
1930s, and indeed to the end of World War II – and beyond,” loosening military controls would 
damage the US in the long term.154 When Ambassador Erwin Reischauer arrived in Tokyo in 
April 1961, he privately told Japanese audiences, “America’s security umbrella restrained right-
wing elements in Japan who favored large-scale rearmament.”155 
By 1954, Japan was equipped with a de facto army, air force, and navy. It would emerge 
as one of the world’s foremost military powers by the mid-60s.  However, its capacity for 
independent, even defensive action was still fundamentally circumscribed. The May 1954 
Defense Agency Establishment Bill created a Ministry of Defense, National Defense Council, 
Joint Staff Council, and the three Self-Defense Force armed services.156 By 1969, Japan’s 
defense budget was nearly as large as those of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, and Thailand combined.157 Yet some scholars 
have suggested that neither the Second Defense Buildup (1962-66) nor the Third (1967-71) 
resulted in significant gains in terms of quality or mission capability. This would include 
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defending the home islands from invasion and protecting shipping.158 Japanese officials 
supported such limits because they worried that if Japan possessed substantial arms, they could 
be easily entrapped in US wars in the Far East. A capacity for inter-island defense “also implied 
a capacity, given American naval and air support, to launch an invasion of the Kuriles, Sakhalin, 
Kamchatka and, perhaps, the Korean peninsula of the Siberian Maritime Province.”159 
They were not wrong to suspect the US might try to restrict Japanese autonomy. 160 
Under the MSA aid scheme, the US supplied the vast majority of Japanese ammunition, 
weapons, communications equipment, and vehicles into the 1960s. The United States retained 
legal ownership over much of the war materiel, including approximately forty percent of the 
Japanese navy and naval air force in 1968. Even into the 1970s, a United States Military 
Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG-J) exercised control over Japanese strategic and tactical 
planning, maneuvers, and finances. In 1957, the Air Self Defence Headquarters were moved into 
the same building as the American Fifth Air Force in Fuchu to be monitored by their US 
advisers. Even its operational language was changed to English. Moreover, as Japanese 
ambassador to the UK Nishi Haruhiko noted, “Japan ha[d] no access to independent military 
intelligence with which it could counter [the contentions] of the United States side.”161 On 
September 2, 1959, Lieutenant-General Robert W. Burns (Fifth Air Force) had Air Marshall 
Matsumae Masuo (Air Defense Command) sign a secret agreement for emergency planning.  
The upshot was that an American intervention in Korea or elsewhere, or an attack on American 
forces stationed in East Asia, could automatically put Japanese Self-Defense Forces on alert 
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without any constitutional and legal procedures being observed.162 The US eventually accepted 
Japanese requests for more balanced MSA aid and began to direct it towards naval and air assets 
instead of manpower. Yet according Air Marshal Genda Minoru in 1964, “[t]he main objective 
of Japan’s air defence network is to protect America’s retaliatory power, to guard the bases from 
which America’s retaliatory power will take off. Our radar network and so on have the same 
function.”163 Protection of US forces in Japan was the chief function of the Air Self Defense 
Force for most of the Cold War; even advocates of a greater regional role for Japan “always 
assumed Japan would remain, indefinitely, an American satellite.”164 
 
The Nixon Shocks and Détente 
Ironically, the culmination of American frustration with Japanese burdensharing at the 
height of the Vietnam War led to President Richard Nixon valuing the “containment” of Japan 
more highly than any previous or future administration. Japan’s participation in Vietnam never 
expanded beyond medical and humanitarian supplies, leading President Johnson to clarify, “what 
I am interested in is bodies.”165 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara called for a new 
Japanese ‘leadership role’ in Asia. The State Department demanded that “this potential tower of 
strength for the Free World” play “its full constructive role in Asia or beyond,” but it was of no 
avail.166 Exasperated, Johnson sent a message to Tokyo saying America had kept “an arm around 
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the Japanese and held an umbrella over them” for far too long.167 So by the time of Nixon’s 
ascendance to the presidency, Japan’s intransigence on burdensharing issues had begun a sea 
change in how many thought about its place in America’s Asia.168  
Certainly, both the president and Congress believed American allies should carry more of 
what they considered to be the common burden. In a 1967 essay Nixon had argued for 
“Vietnamization” of the war, “a view Asians took to mean that they were to fight other Asians 
for U.S. objectives.”169 Indeed, in Article IV of the 1969 Joint Communiqué between Nixon and 
Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, the United States managed to get Japan to state that the security of 
South Korea and Taiwan were “essential to Japan’s own security.”170 On July 25, 1969 at a press 
briefing in Guam, Nixon detailed what quickly became known as the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ or ‘Guam 
Doctrine.’ America would withdraw significant numbers of ground forces throughout Asia in 
light of the incredible economic and psychological cost of the Vietnam War.171 Japan was 
expected to pick up the slack. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s 1971 Defense Report 
expressed this imminent prospect of offloading much of America’s burdens. It stated, “we do 
intend to maintain strong air, naval, and support capabilities… [b]ut we shall look to the nation 
directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its 
defense.”172 Washington would strive “to establish a new and stable structure reflecting the 
renewed vigor of small Asian states,” with an “expanding role” for Japan.173 Furthermore, the 
new administration hinted it would accept, if not outright encourage, Japanese acquisition of 
                                                
167 Quoted in Schaller, Altered States, 208. 
168 Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, 211-212. 
169 LaFeber, 348. 
170 Quoted in Welfield, 250. 
171 Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, 211. 
172 Quoted in Osgood, 5. 
173 Quoted in ibid., 15 
Douglas 43 
nuclear weapons.174 As Nixon began his presidency, all signs indicated he would continue to take 
up the anti-Communist mantle and pressure Japan for large-scale rearmament.175 
Yet all was not well in the alliance. Suspicion and contempt of Tokyo as a security and 
economic partner wracked Washington. Japan’s export sector had made great leaps in the 
previous quarter-century, so much so that many political and business leaders suggested the 
Japanese revival threatened US security. One Cabinet member maintained that in the 1970s, “the 
Japanese are still fighting the war” and had the intention to “dominate the Pacific and then 
perhaps the world.”176 In 1971, a Foreign Service Officer hinted privately that Nixon regarded 
Japan as an “enemy.” This was particularly true after the White House came to believe Prime 
Minister Sato was purposefully fudging a textiles deal struck up at the signing of the Joint 
Communiqué.177 At Kansas City in 1971, the president went on to announce the arrival of five 
“great economic superpowers” including Japan, signifying the US would treat Japan more as a 
rival than an ally.178 
 The economic threat crept into perceptions of or reinforced Americans trepidations about 
Japanese security policy. A March 1971 poll jointly conducted by the Asahi Shimbun and the 
Harris Corporation found little US interest in an active Japanese Self Defense Force. Seventy-
two percent opposed the creation of a Japanese force de frappe, or independent nuclear arsenal. 
By way of explanation, the Asahi Shimbun noted that Japan and the United States had 
historically been rivals for mastery of the Pacific.179 For many American policymakers, the 1970 
announcement by Defense Agency Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro that Japanese military 
                                                
174 See LaFeber, xxi, 349-350; Schaller, Altered States, 213, 218-219, 230, and 243. 
175 Welfield, 242. Such a stance would have paralleled a popular sentiment, channeled by Alabama Governor 
George Wallace in the 1972 presidential race, that “[t]he war in Vietnam would have been over a long time ago if 
Japanese troops had joined us,” and the U.S would no longer act as a shield for Japan. Quoted in LaFeber, 358. 
176 Quoted in Schaller, Altered States, 4. 
177 LaFeber, 351. 
178 Ibid., 353. 
179 Welfield, 285 and 287. 
Douglas 44 
expenditure would double by 1975 under the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan was unnerving rather 
than gratifying.180 For many but not all Japanese officials, the defeat and withdrawal from 
Vietnam shifted the emphasis of their fears from entrapment in American wars to abandonment 
against China and the Soviet Union.181 Yet, the “prospect of America’s disengagement from the 
Far East… threaten[ed] to bring to the forefront of Japanese attention painful and divisive issues 
that were suppressed when the nation was more confident of American protection.”182 Once out 
of office, Robert Osgood, a staff aide on Henry Kissinger’s National Security Council from 1969 
to 1970, wrote that while American withdrawals aimed at transferring more responsibility for 
“national defense” to Asian allies, the Nixon administration clearly did “not envisage other states 
supplanting America’s security role.” Aside from a few hardline Cold Warriors, “the U.S. 
government does not expect or desire Japan to assume the security role the United States has 
played in East Asia.”183 The reason? “With its ties to the United States loosened or severed, 
Japan’s pursuit of this role would accentuate Sino-Japanese tensions and destabilize the Korean 
peninsula.”184 The benefits of greater burdensharing, or “devolution” of power to Japan, had to 
be weighed against the costs of loss of US control and the destabilization of the Asian military 
balance.185 Perhaps in recognition of this possible effect of US retrenchment, Nixon privately 
told members of Congress that he “wouldn’t be surprised if in five years we didn’t have to 
restrain” Japan.186 Nixon was widely suspected of being the anonymous “high American” 
official who told journalists in 1970 the US-Japan alliance was partly intended to “police Japan 
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against turning communist or returning to militarism.”187 Perhaps the ultimate reason for this 
shift is what former US diplomat Harrison Holland suggested in later years, that “[o]ften in the 
past when the United States was strong and Japan weak, relations were reasonably free from 
friction and controversy. But when both nations were more equal in national power, relations 
turned cold and adversarial.”188  
The same fears of full-scale, autonomous rearmament distressed Japan’s Asian neighbors. 
As Osgood noted in 1972, Chinese and Soviet leaders at least publicly claimed “to see the rise of 
Japanese militarism as the sure result of the Nixon Doctrine.”189 Combined with the Sato-Nixon 
Joint Communiqué and expectation of a massive Fourth Defense Buildup Plan, Communist and 
non-Communist countries alike feared the US was encouraging the revival of Japanese 
hegemony under the false moniker of ‘burdensharing.’ In July 1971, Gough Whitlam, Australian 
Labour Party chief and future prime minister, told Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, “[we] have the 
same fear of the Japanese as I believe your people have now,” since the US-Australian alliance 
was designed to counter the “revival of Japanese militarism.”190 Zhou echoed the sentiments in a 
joint communiqué with North Korean leader Kim Il-sung in April 1970, declaring that “under the 
active protection of the American imperialists, Japanese militarism has already been revived.”191 
To the Romanians, he cited Japan’s economic expansion, the latent capacity for military power it 
would inevitably bring, and the inclusion of South Korean and Taiwan security in the 1969 U.S.-
Japan Joint Communiqué.192 A substantial Japanese minority, too, developed anxiety that 
rearmament under the Sato government was destabilizing the region and could lead to the revival 
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of militarism.193 Throughout the Cold War, the Chinese leadership had argued that encouraging 
Tokyo to break away from Washington’s vassalage was the best method for curbing imperialism 
in Asia.194 Yet by 1970, Zhou, at least, was privately considering whether America defending 
Japan was a better insurance policy for Chinese security than a Japan that defended itself.195 
Feeling the changing winds, Nixon and Kissinger decided to remold post-Vietnam Asia 
along the lines of a détente with Communist China. One of its first principles was a combined 
effort to suppress the reemergence of Japan as an independent pole of military power. On June 2, 
1971, the president discussed his intentions with his staff. As he would later explain to Chinese 
Chairman Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, US retrenchment in Asia could have only two possible 
outcomes: alignment with the Soviet Union or full-scale rearmament. Mao and Zhou publicly 
demanded the US abandon its military presence in Japan and South Korea, but in fact they “don’t 
want that” because the American hub-and-spokes system was “China’s [best] hope for Jap 
restraint.”196 On two secret trips to China in July and October 1971, Kissinger argued with Zhou 
that a “Japan which defends itself with its own resources will be an objective danger to all 
countries around it because it will be so much more powerful.”197 He did not want to see Japan 
“heavily re-armed” because the US could not control a great power.198 Neither America nor 
China would benefit if the alliance no longer served as a tool of management. Kissinger went on 
to say the American government would oppose Japanese nuclear proliferation, the development 
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of offensive military capabilities, and the “extension of military power” in the Far East.199 Zhou 
eventually agreed, stating, for instance, that “objectively speaking for you to keep forces on 
Taiwan to prevent Japan from sending its forces to Taiwan is beneficial to the relaxation of 
tension in the Far East.”200 
The focus on containing Japan in the Kissinger-Zhou talks was echoed the following year 
between Nixon and Mao. On the eve of Nixon’s 1971 announcement, Secretary of Defense Laird 
told Japanese and South Korean audiences that he was “eminently satisfied with the status quo. 
Japan’s existing military power… would be sufficient to fulfill its tasks under the Nixon 
Doctrine.”201 When they met in February 1972, Zhou told Nixon that “Japan’s feathers have 
grown on its wings and it is about to take off.” Adding a second metaphor, he asked whether 
America could tame this “wild horse.”202 Nixon used yet a third metaphor (with more to come) 
to answer with a conditional yes: “The United States can get out of Japanese waters, but others 
will still fish there. If we were to leave Japan naked and defenseless, they would have to turn to 
others for help or build their own capability to defend themselves.”203 A United States “shield” 
gave it a veto over the defense policies of the world’s second richest state.204 Without it, “our 
protests, no matter how loud, would be like firing an empty cannon. We would have no effect, 
because thousands of miles away is just too far to be heard.”205 At the final banquet and 
communiqué, Nixon chose not to contradict the Chinese leadership’s public diatribe against 
Japanese militarism.206 
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 Détente, based on the discouragement of Japanese assertiveness in defense policy, would 
continued relatively unchanged through the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter administrations. So 
long as the relaxation of tensions continued, “Washington’s enthusiasm to have Japan assume the 
burdens of containment had temporarily faded.”207 By the middle of the decade, the Self Defense 
Forces had emerged as a significant power in the Western Pacific but still lacked any robust 
capability to project power in Korea, China, or Southeast Asia. In particular, Japan was unable to 
protect sea-lanes or transport expeditionary forces without the assistance of the United States. 
This situation was not totally unintended by the latter.208 The confluence of domestic opposition, 
a lack of strong encouragement from Washington, and the 1973 oil crisis led to significant 
reductions in the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan, which was not adopted at all until Prime Minister 
Tanaka returned from his own trip to China in 1972. As Osgood noted knowledgably, American 
strategists essentially sought to promote limited rearmament and stability through “close military 
collaboration in plans and operations and burdensharing in order to enlarge the scope of allied 
participation, while leaving the United States exclusive responsibility for the control of nuclear 
weapons and the preponderant role in managing the military balance.”209 However, the near total 
favoring of collective security concerns over collective defense concerns under the Nixon 
Doctrine lasted only as long as détente lasted between the superpowers. 
 
The End of Détente to the End of the Cold War 
Strident calls for Japanese burdensharing resumed when détente fell apart in the late 
1970s, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Beginning in the spring of 
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1978, both Washington and Beijing began pressuring Japan to help contain the Soviet Union in a 
grand coalition. Congress adopted a resolution the same year calling for significant increases in 
Japanese defense spending.210 So when the Japanese government announced in December 1979 
that it could only marginally grow its military expenditure due to budgetary pressures, Carter’s 
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
criticized their ally publicly.211 Brown visited Tokyo the following December to tell the 
government personally that their burdensharing was “so modest that it conveys a sense of 
complacency which is simply not justified by the facts.”212 Writing in Foreign Affairs, former 
US ambassador to the UN George Ball predicted irreparable damage to the alliance if Tokyo 
could not shake the ‘freerider’ label.213 When Ronald Reagan came to power in 1981, he was 
committed to launching a massive arms race against the Soviet Union. This quest to reestablish 
global superiority required taking “better advantage of our political, economic and other assets – 
and those of our allies,” noted a senior State Department official.214 Reagan pledged he would 
force Japan to protect its own sea-lanes out to a distance of 1,000 miles and help bottle up the 
Soviet Fleet in eastern Siberia, to which Tokyo reluctantly agreed.215 Japan also received 
significant encouragement from China in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1979, Chairman 
Deng Xiaoping declared that the United States, China, and Japan must unite to defeat “the polar 
bear.” The following year, Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Xiuquan announced his unconditional 
support for increasing the capabilities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.216 
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While Reagan found a kindred spirit in Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro beginning in 
1982, the same old fears of a Japanese military revival persisted, albeit at a lower level and in 
opposition to the majority view at the time. Nakasone poured considerable resources into the 
Japanese military machine during the 1983-87 defense plan period. Most went into new 
technology, the navy, and the air force.217 While the success seemed slight to American 
audiences and critical pressure for rearmament continued, Japan broke the one percent of GNP 
military expenditure ceiling in 1987. This had been a “psychologically important taboo” for 
decades.218 The speed of Nakasone’s military buildup, however modest by American standards, 
sent ripples of worry through US and Chinese diplomatic establishments.  
A telling debate took place between Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1982-83. Weinberger and his staff hoped Nakasone would rearm 
so quickly that Japan could take control over the defense of its own territory and the 
surroundings areas within the decade. Shultz, in contrast, was furious the DoD would 
countenance anything other than increased financial contributions. Although he eventually lost 
the argument within the administration, Shultz remained adamant that “the last thing Americans 
should want is the recreation of a massive Japanese military machine,” especially one capable of 
power projection in a 1,000-mile radius onto alarmed US allies like the Philippines.219  
By the mid-80s, fear of Japan’s aggressive military drive had ended the grand anti-Soviet 
coalition. Chinese officials again perceived danger from the rise of Japanese militarism, 
especially after Nakasone’s abolition of the one percent expenditure ceiling.220 Now out of 
office, Henry Kissinger sensed in 1987 that the trilateral détente he masterminded was cracking. 
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In a January Washington Post op-ed, he criticized “American leaders [who] seem to believe 
[Japan’s] growing military strength will ease America’s defense burdens” as a “quick fix.” If 
Washington tried to force the pace of major rearmament, it “could lead to destabilizing 
compensations by other Asian nations,” since “any increase in strength by one country produces 
almost automatic adjustments by all other nations in a position to see their own security.” At this 
point, Kissinger argued, any further increases in Japanese defense expenditure were 
“unnecessary,” and “Japan could make a more significant contribution to global peace by 
increasing aid to developing nations.”221 Expressing similar sentiments, Marine Corps Major 
General Henry Stackpole caused a popular uproar in March 1990 by suggesting American forces 
“were acting as a ‘cap in the bottle’ to prevent future aggression by Japan.”222 By the end of the 
decade, its Asian neighbors had begun to worry once more as well. Singaporean Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew publicly expressed anxiety over the extension of Japanese power in Asia that 
would follow if the alliance were ever seriously disrupted.223 
The Cold War ended with Japan having one of the world’s largest military budgets and 
yet still reluctant and unequipped for power projection. As pressures for Japanese burdensharing 
continued to mount, especially following the 1990-91 Gulf War, Americans came to settle more 
and more for the “checkbook diplomacy” originally favored by Shultz and to some extent 
Kissinger. In 1987, the House of Representatives passed a resolution demanding the Secretary of 
State negotiate either the increase of Japanese military spending to three percent of GNP or the 
forfeiture of an equivalent sum to the United States.224 Such calls were especially prevalent 
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during negotiations with the Japanese over their refusal to participate in the liberation of Kuwait. 
Ultimately, Tokyo contributed $11 billion toward the overall cost.225 Probably speaking for the 
diplomatic rather than the defense establishment, former diplomat Harrison Holland explained in 
1992 that US calls for greater burdensharing “is generally considered by both sides to mean an 
increase in financial support,” since “a strong Japanese military presence in Asia would 
destabilize security in the area.226 This approach was advantageous from an American standpoint 
because it allowed the United States to exert control on the cheap. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 
1987, “the preferable way of redistributing the burden would be for the allies to pay an increased 
share of the costs of the American forces protecting them.”227 Secretary of Defense Richard 
Cheney, for example, asked Tokyo to begin paying more than 50 percent of support costs for US 
forces stationed in Japan under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Yet, in the end, more 
than 70 percent of Japanese people surveyed in 1990 opposed paying greater sums for what they 
considered to be mercenary forces.228 
 
Conclusion 
 Throughout the Cold War, American policymakers confronted a burdensharing dilemma 
on the strategic place of Japan in Asia. On the one hand, there was consistent support for greater 
Japanese responsibility in local, regional, and global security. On the other, fears of a 
destabilizing revival of autonomous Japanese military power existed throughout the military and 
diplomatic services of the United States, its allies, and its adversaries. As a general rule, the 
imperative of collective defense usually won out over the imperative of collective security, but as 
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much as possible American officials tried to circumscribe Japan’s the capacity for independent 
decisionmaking and action. With the end of the Cold War, the burdensharing dilemma was not 
resolved, but the US and Japan could kick the can down the road until the next great power 
rivalry emerged between China and the United States in the late 2000s. 
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Chapter 4: Burdensharing in the Rebalance to Asia 
 
Introduction 
Burdensharing is even more important in America’s Rebalance to Asia than it was during 
the Cold War. The ultimate reason is simple: the United States cannot balance against China’s 
phenomenal economic and military rise alone. In light of the disastrous unilateralism of the Bush 
years, America’s continuing economic malaise following the 2007-8 Great Recession, and a 
reluctance to retrench in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, American deterrence strategy 
towards China is relying more and more on the defense spending and activism of its Asian allies. 
This is particularly true for Japan. The growth of Chinese power, along with the perception that 
this power is turning outward maliciously, has laid the foundation for an Asian arms race. 
Japanese territory is threatened now more than at any other period in the history of the alliance. 
Many American officials and nongovernmental observers are wholeheartedly encouraging 
Japan’s abandonment of its postwar pacifism. Yet, the extent to which Japan is increasingly 
defending itself within a virtually automatic American guarantee is undermining US control over 
the direction of the alliance. Already, attempts at alliance management have been frustrated in a 
series of dangerous and provocative incidents that together raise the specter of America’s ‘wire’ 
being ‘tripped,’ perhaps by its own ally. In remains to be seen whether mechanisms of control 
over Japanese burdensharing will be successful. They are increasingly under stress. 
 
Reaffirming the American Commitment… to Burdensharing 
President Barack Obama launched the first Global Force Posture Review since 2004 
when he came to power in 2009. The goal was to make US defense strategy “strategically sound, 
Douglas 55 
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.”229 With conflicts brewing between a rising 
China and its neighbors, American officials came to the conclusion that Asia is the region most 
in need of US attention. Published just prior to the current president’s tenure, the 2008 National 
Defense Strategy had sought to “prevent the re-emergence of great power rivalry.”230 Like Nixon 
and Reagan, the Obama administration determined to reestablish its leadership around the world 
in its own way.231  
Yet policymakers quickly found they would have to rely on allied contributions more 
than in the past. The 2010 National Security Strategy notes that while America has a “unique 
responsibility to promote international security,” when “we act without partners, then our 
military is overstretched, [and] Americans bear a greater burden.”232 Allies would have to be 
“force multipliers.”233 Likewise, the 2011 National Military Strategy longs for the US role as the 
world’s “security guarantor”—not ‘one security guarantor among many’—to continue through 
the bilateral alliance structure. To reassure American allies and deter conflict at this “strategic 
inflection” point in world history, the document proclaims the US intention to remain a powerful 
force in Northeast Asia “for decades.” However, it also recognizes the infeasibility of acting 
alone as America did in the Bush years. To deter the strongest threats, the American defense 
establishment is urged to accept a “multi-nodal world” and “encourage the development of 
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security ties and commitments that are emerging among our allies and partners in the region.” 
This would include, for instance, “work[ing] with the Japan Self-Defense Forces to improve their 
out-of-area operational capabilities.”234 Although the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance 
announces optimistically that the US military “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific region” and continue to “provide a stabilizing presence,” it emphasizes the necessity of 
low-cost, small footprint approaches and building “partner capacity.”235  
The American diplomatic service launched its own campaign in late 2011. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton declared in an October Foreign Policy article that America had reached a 
“pivot point” and it was time to “return to Asia.”236 She explained further in November that 
decades of US military predominance had discouraged conflict, thus sowing the seeds of Asian 
prosperity: “American ships patrol sea lanes and keep them safe for trade; American diplomats 
help settle disputes among nations before they escalate.”237 American commitments to its treaty 
allies were “rock solid.” When President Obama spoke before the Australian Parliament at the 
height of his Asian diplomatic tour in November 2011, he avowed that “as a Pacific nation, the 
United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.” 
Reductions in overall military expenditure, he claimed, would not come at the expense of US 
missions in Asia.238  
Ultimately, the various announcements and advertising of the Pivot may have convinced 
many Asian countries that American diplomacy is on focused their region. Yet the ongoing lack 
of resources to fund the military aspect of the Pivot has not convinced them of American staying 
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power. Instead, the reassurance dynamic US-Japan relations and others are experiencing now 
may be what Robert Osgood prophesied for the Nixon Doctrine in 1972: “incurring at least the 
added political burden, if not the military risk, of America’s retaining responsibility for the 
security of Japan’s international environment without being able to satisfy the Japanese that U.S. 
protection is adequate.”239 
 
The Eroding Asian Military Balance 
 For reasons that must include wishful thinking, it is now obvious that defense and 
diplomatic officials who expected the easy reestablishment of US military supremacy in Asia 
had visions of grandeur. Since the Budget Control Act of 2011 took effect on March 1, 2013, 
policymakers have been forced to grapple with severe, indiscriminate defense cuts costing the 
DoD $1 trillion over the next decade. The majority view among defense analysts and interested 
politicians is that sequestration is a disaster for the Rebalance. Even before the cuts, then 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta commented on an independent CSIS assessment by saying 
that “[s]equestration would devastate the Department’s ability to advance and sustain 
enhancements to our defense presence and posture in the Asia-Pacific region.”240 At Secretary of 
State John Kerry’s confirmation hearing on January 24, 2013, Senator Marco Rubio inquired 
sardonically of the nominee, “I congratulate the President for talking about pivoting to Asia, but 
if this sequester goes through, what are we going to pivot with?”241 The head of Pacific 
Command (PACOM), Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, also told the Senate Armed Services 
Committee soon after that “sequestration would have a catastrophic effect on our ability to do the 
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type of global operations we’re doing today.”242 Later in 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck 
Hagel lamented that under the sequester, US “military options and flexibility will be severely 
constrained.”243 House Armed Services Committee Buck McKeon has called the Rebalance 
strategy increasingly “unrealistic.”244 The atmosphere towards removing sequester-level caps has 
become so pessimistic that Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Katrina McFarland 
was quoted in March as saying, “Right now, the pivot is being looked at again, because candidly 
it can’t happen.”245  
Much was originally made of Secretary Panetta’s announcement that by 2020, 60 percent 
of US naval assets would be posted in the Pacific Ocean, as opposed to the old 50-50 split two-
ocean navy.246 Yet with even more cuts pending, a common refrain is now former Pacific Air 
Forces commander General William Begert prediction from 2012: 60 percent of the force may be 
devoted to the Pacific, but “that may be only because you decreased… every place else not 
because you increased force structure out in the Pacific.”247 American forces charged with 
defending the areas surrounding Japan are unlikely to be reduced in absolute terms. There have 
been some small successes, like the rotational deployment of two or three RQ-4 Global Hawk 
drones in Japan,248 two squadrons of MV-22 Osprey tiltrotors in Okinawa,249 and six advanced 
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P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft.250 Yet even under the ideal conditions originally envisioned before 
sequestration, the Pacific Fleet would only see a net increase of one aircraft carrier, four 
destroyers, three Zumwalt destroyers, ten Littoral Combat Ships, and two submarines.251 With 
the deployment of F-35B Joint Strike Fighters and two more Aegis-equipped ballistic-missile 
defense ships planned for 2017, American forces in Japan can expect to see some increased 
firepower.252 However, the increase will only be marginal unless drastic changes in defense 
policy occur in the near future. Most new ships and jets sent to the Pacific will simply be 
replacements for aging hardware already in the theater.  
China, on the other hand, is widely seen as rapidly catching up with American military 
power in the Western Pacific. Even if milder cuts or even modest increases replaced 
sequestration, the current military balance is impossible to maintain. Baring a Chinese economic 
collapse or a fundamental revision of Asian international relations, the People’s Republic of 
China will continue to grow economically and increase its defense expenditure at a significantly 
higher rate than the United States or China’s neighbors. In March, the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) announced a 12.2% budget increase for 2014. This continues decades-long annual growth 
in the double digits.253 By contrast, the DoD expects a 20% overall reduction between 2010 and 
2017.254 
Certainly, the United States will retain global military superiority for decades to come, 
but Asians are not concerned with its global reach. The real contest is the balance of power in 
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China’s immediate periphery, or the “First Island Chain” running roughly from the Kurile 
Islands through the Japanese archipelago to Taiwan, the Philippines, and the South China Sea. 
Over the past decade, the PLA has developed a variety of asymmetric warfighting capabilities, 
such as anti-ship cruise (ASCMs) and ballistic missiles (ASBMs), designed to deny the United 
States access to seas adjacent to China’s coast.255 The aircraft carrier, America’s premier 
platform for power projection, now likely operates only at great risk within China’s Near Seas.256 
China is quickly constructing its own blue water navy in addition to this “anti-Navy.”257 
According to recent reports, the PLA Navy (PLAN) eventually plans to build four of its own 
aircraft carriers. From there, it could begin to project power in the East China Sea, South China 
Sea, and beyond.258 The United States may retain conventional superiority in these regions 
currently, but the near future is much more ambiguous. In May 2013, the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace released an unclassified ‘net assessment’ of the balance between China’s 
military and the US-Japan alliance. It speculates that by the year 2030, “the U.S.-Japan alliance 
will either only narrowly retain military superiority in the airspace and waters near Japan or the 
balance will become uncertain at best.”259 
Caught between near constant pressure from the PLAN and Chinese Coast Guard on the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and declining American relative influence, many Japanese officials feel 
they have little choice but to boost their own indigenous defense spending, perhaps even rapidly. 
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In sharp distinction with the modus vivendi of the Cold War, Japanese are increasingly 
convinced that the US alliance, while necessary, is no longer a sufficient guarantee of Japan’s 
security. Ishiba Shigeru, the Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
wrote in an op-ed that he has come to realize the “[h]istory of mankind is [the] history of war.” 
Under such conditions, he wondered, “[i]f Chinese power rises as U.S. power relatively falls, 
how can military balance be maintained?”260 Combined with a growing nuclear threat from 
North Korea, LDP Deputy Secretary-General Gen Nakatani believes that for Tokyo to continue 
to wholly rely on Washington would be choosing to “just sit idly and await death.”261 Yosuke 
Isozaki, a parliamentarian and special national security adviser to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
said in March 2014 that “[t]ruth be told, the U.S. can no longer afford to play the world’s 
policeman.”262 The 2013 Defense of Japan White Paper names China as a significant threat, 
given “the rapid expansion and intensification of activities by China in the waters and airspace 
around Japan.”263 These fears have been stoked in part by the profession of many American 
officials that they are unwilling to go to war with China “over rocks.”264 
Despite significant domestic opposition, the Japanese government under Shinzo Abe has 
begun a fundamental revision of its attitude towards defense.265 Visiting Washington in February 
2013, Prime Minister Abe addressed a distinguished group of officials and think tankers at CSIS. 
He declared, “[i]t is high time in this age of Asian resurgence for Japan to bear even more 
responsibilities.” Abe received a resounding applause when he pledged to “give back a strong 
                                                
260 Ishiba Shigeru, “Managing Contingencies Requires Change in Thinking,” The Japan Times, March 28, 2014. 
261 Quoted in Linda Sieg, “Insight: Japan Unease over U.S. Alliance Adds Fuel to Abe's Security Shift,” Reuters, 
February 4, 2014.  
262 Quoted in Yuka Hayashi, “Japanese Officials Discuss Perceived Decline in U.S. Military Might,” Wall Street 
Journal, Japan Real Time, March 6, 2014. 
263 State of Japan. Ministry of Defense. 2013 Defense of Japan (2013). 
264 See, for example, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “US Won’t Fight China Over Pacific ‘Rock’; PACOM Strives For 
Strategic ‘Ambiguity’,” Breaking Defense, September 19, 2012. 
265 See, for example, “Abe's Unacceptable Rush toward Collective Self-Defense,” Asahi Shimbun, March 4, 2014; 
"LDP, New Komeito Differ over Collective Self-Defense," The Japan Times, January 27, 2014. 
Douglas 62 
Japan, strong enough to do even more good for the betterment of the world.”266 To reinforce the 
point, he wore an aviator's jacket labeled “Japan Air Self-Defense Force” when he first arrived. 
During his meeting with President Obama, he said he planned to hasten plans for the 
modernization of the Self Defence Forces so as to “ease pressure on the U.S.” for countering 
China’s rise.267 Japan is increasing the size of its submarine force for the first time in 36 years.268 
It announced in January 2013 that it would begin increasing its military budget after eleven years 
of decline.269 In December, the Ministry of Defense announced it would seek the largest 
increases in defense expenditure since the end of the Cold War at roughly three to five percent 
over the next five years.270 In 2010, Japan began realigning its most capable forces away from 
the old Cold War focus on Hokkaido and towards its southern islands, nearer the action over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.271 The government accelerated this shift to “southern defense” in 
2013.272 All within the span of two years, Abe has created Japan’s first National Security 
Council,273 published its first National Security Strategy,274 eased restrictions on the export of 
military technology,275 and taken the first steps towards revising the constitutional interpretation 
of Japan’s right to collective self-defense.276 All of these changes are indicative of a growing 
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trend in the US-Japan alliance: greater Japanese burden- and rolesharing. As Shinichi Kitaoka, 
president of International University of Japan and an Abe adviser, said in March, Japan needs “to 
become [more] independent” in order to “protect its security in the current conditions.”277 Abe 
believes that “Japan is expected to exert leadership not just on the economic front but also in the 
field of security in the Asia-Pacific.”278 
One result of this shift is that in the future, incidents and crises that could trigger US 
defense commitments may not initially involve American forces. Not US, but rather Japanese 
assets forward deployed in the East China Sea may be the first participants in skirmishes with 
Chinese forces in the area. Former defense official Kyouji Yanagisawa has noted that this would 
“fundamentally change the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance” because the roles of “Japan holding 
the defensive ‘shield’ while America supplies the offensive ‘sword’ ” would be reversed.279 In 
January 2014, PACOM commander Admiral Locklear admitted that as the United States’ 
“historic dominance… is diminishing,”280 Asia is becoming the “the most militarized region in 
the world.”281 As it does, American will have to expect that its allies’ and adversaries’ “militaries 
are going to have to encounter and operate around each other” more than ever before. Journalist 
Trefor Moss has written that “[i]f Japan is to assume a greater share of the regional security 
burden, then the JSDF needs to acquire the capability to manage the country’s territorial disputes 
independently, without U.S. forces.”282 Indeed, there has been public speculation on the part of 
informed nongovernmental observers and former officials that the US may force Japan to handle 
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any initial hostilities or ‘gray zone’ incidents over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by itself.283 This 
may appear to be a small victory for those who demand flexibility in American alliance 
commitments and a step away from entrapment. In reality, allowing Japan to defend itself 
tactically within an overall extended deterrence framework that approaches automaticity cedes 
responsibility for escalation control to Tokyo. If conflict erupted over the disputed islands and 
spiraled into anything more than a small skirmish, US forces in nearby Okinawa would be 
destined to fight in it nevertheless. 
 
Fears of Tactical and Strategic Entrapment 
 As Tacitus said of the Romans, it would not bother most Americans if “the provinces 
were conquered by the blood of the provinces.”284 Congress usually appreciates any easing of 
overseas military burdens by treaty allies, encouraging them as Senator Bill Nelson described it 
in 2012 to increase “their percentage of partnership costs.”285 There are very good reasons to 
desire burdensharing or even rolesharing. Indeed, notwithstanding the historical irony, US 
Marines today are training their Japanese counterparts in amphibious warfare and, essentially, 
island-hopping tactics.286 At an October 2013 “2+2” Security Consultative Conference in Tokyo 
with Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida and Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera, 
Kerry and Hagel affirmed their support for greater Japanese burdensharing. “The United States,” 
                                                
283 Yukio Okamoto, “US-Japan Security Seminar,” (panel discussion, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C., March 25, 2014); Michael Green et al., “What To Do About Tensions in Asia,” (panel, Council 
on Foreign Relations, New York, NY, January 28, 2014). 
284 Quoted in Alberico Gentili, The Wars of the Romans, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011): xviii. 
285 U.S. Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department of the Air 
Force of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program (112th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., March 20, 2012). 
286 See Mathew M. Burke, “Japanese Troops Heading to California to Train with Marines,” Stars and Stripes, 
January 5, 2012; Helene Cooper, “In Japan’s Drill With the U.S., a Message for Beijing,” New York Times, February 
22, 2014. 
Douglas 65 
they said in a joint statement, “welcomed Japan’s determination to contribute more proactively to 
regional and global peace and security.”287 The phrasing, worked out jointly between the four 
representatives and their staffs, has been interpreted as one of the “clearest signals yet that the 
United States backs Japan’s increasing though still limited moves to strengthen its military.”288 
 Yet the document is also important for what it omitted. For some time now, the Japanese 
government has been mulling over the decision to acquire long-range strike capabilities, 
including aircraft but primarily missile technology. Currently, launching retaliatory or 
preemptive attacks on North Korean nuclear sites or Chinese missile facilities would require US 
support for attack aircraft and intelligence.289 The Japanese government under Shinzo Abe is 
dissatisfied with this lack of capacity for autonomy. In July 2013, a Defense Ministry official 
specified that the measures Japan seeks include the ability for “attacks by aircraft or missiles and 
sending soldiers directly to the site.”290 Possession of the offensive capabilities necessary for 
such military action is unconstitutional under the existing interpretation, but officials have been 
discussing revision since at least 2006.291 According to unnamed sources cited by The Asahi 
Shimbun, US officials offered no response at the two-plus-two meeting when Japan’s desire to 
possess a preemptive strike capability was mentioned.292 Yet in an account obtained by The 
Japan Times, one American official attending working-level preparatory talks in July lectured 
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Tokyo on “the possible negative fallout on neighboring countries if the Abe administration 
embarks on such a policy shift.”293 Following American pressure, the subject was dropped from 
the content of the joint statement. Instead, it mentioned the desire for “Japan [to] continue 
coordinating closely with the United States to expand its role within the framework of the U.S.-
Japan Alliance;” “[s]ide-by-side… contingency response and crisis management;” “[i]mproved 
cooperation and coordination;” and “progress on bilateral planning and reaffirmed efforts toward 
refining bilateral plans.”294 
 Americans’ fears are twofold. They reflect the distinction and connection between 
‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ entrapment. First, at an operational level, the possession of independent 
capabilities for offensive military action raises the possibility that Japan could strike North 
Korean or Chinese military bases preemptively or in retaliation without US support, or even 
foreknowledge and consent. US forces are stationed throughout Japan and particularly in 
Okinawa—situated close to the disputed southern Ryukyus. Their commitment is practically 
guaranteed if Sino-Japanese combat broke out. Any targeting of Japanese bases or future missile 
sites would necessarily fall on American units co-stationed there. Moreover, fearing US reprisals 
in support of Japan, Chinese military leaders might decide to strike predominantly American 
bases in Japan preemptively or in the heat of battle.295 The first evidence of American worry over 
this possibility may be a 2008 nongovernmental workshop on Japan, with a number of eminent 
statesmen in attendance.296 An anonymous participant was quoted as saying, “[t]here is clear 
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evidence of rising Japanese interest in independent non-nuclear strategic strike capabilities. An 
improved Japanese capability to act unilaterally and preemptively is not self-evidently in the 
U.S. national interest.” 
This is, perhaps, the classic definition of entrapment in theories of alliance management. 
In January 2013, the Ministry of Defense began considering authorizing the Air Self-Defence 
Force (ASDF) to fire warnings shots at Chinese planes entering Japanese-administered airspace 
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.297 New guidelines were designed in October to justify 
shooting down Chinese drones in the same area, obviously risking escalation.298 According to 
reports in the Sankei Shimbun, the ASDF began definitively planning procedures in January 2014 
to ground Chinese planes, with “[t]he authority of the pilot is limited to forced landing 
instructions and warning shots.”299 These possibilities may not represent a calculated decision to 
draw the United States into an unwanted war, but they nonetheless threaten one. With Japanese 
jets scrambled 415 times last year against Chinese incursions, up 36% from last year, the risk of 
accident, miscalculation, or irreversible provocation is reaching Cold War highs.300 And to a 
much greater extent than in that era, it is Japanese forces, not American, that are mobilizing 
against the enemy.  
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 The question of mobile jets and ships as forward-deployed ‘spears’ may be more difficult 
to grapple with, but long-range strike capabilities receive the brunt of US officials’ ire because 
they also factor in the second fear: ‘strategic entrapment.’ Unlike military activity over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu, missile strikes could hypothetically be used against other countries nervous 
about Japan’s military revival, like South Korea. However incredible it may seem to most 
Americans, some Asian countries are more worried about the growth of independent Japanese 
power than the growth of China’s.301 Comments by Obama administration officials like State 
Department Policy Planning Director Anne-Marie Slaughter (2009-11) that Japan “is neither 
psychologically ready nor suitable for historical reasons” to “take the reins of global domination 
in the 21st century” are broadly in line with traditional American fears.302 The subject of 
entrapment is a very sensitive one in diplomacy between allies, so worries are usually expressed 
behind the scenes. Yet it has become a strong enough trepidation that current and former US 
officials have expressed concern in public. A former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs (2009-13) who was instrumental in designing the Pivot, Kurt Campbell, has 
noted it is only natural for Japan to want stronger “indigenous capabilities,” but “there are 
probably, quietly some questions in the United States about where Japan is going… [s]o a degree 
of reassurance [from Japan] on these issues is absolutely essential.”303 Although Japan has yet to 
win full support from US officials on acquiring the ability to strike enemy bases—and it is not 
likely to receive it—Abe may insist on including the line, “Japan will consider acquiring 
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comprehensive response capabilities,” in the revision of the 1997 US-Japan Defense Guidelines 
taking place this year.304 
 Certain incidents and the perception of resurgence Japanese nationalism are exacerbating 
these concerns over burdensharing. In 2012, Japan escalated its territorial row with China by 
nationalizing the islands against the explicit advice of the State Department that it would trigger 
a crisis.305 It has so far refused to admit even the existence of a dispute. Likewise, Tokyo is 
taking a more hardline approach than Washington to China’s Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) in the East China Sea.306 Last December, Abe also refused to comply with Vice 
President Joe Biden’s plea not to visit the controversial Yasukini Shrine.307 Citing unnamed US 
government sources, a January 2014 New York Times article explained that encouraging greater 
Japanese burdensharing “may draw protests from regional players, including China, and weaken 
the trilateral framework with South Korea that forms the basis of Washington’s ‘Asia pivot’ 
strategy.”308 Many Japanese themselves, especially the liberal media, have questioned whether 
more spending and activism in defense will lead to a destabilizing arms race with China and 
poorer relations with potential friends.309 According to the Asahi Shimbun, South Korean 
government representatives have cautioned that “[i]f matters are handled incorrectly, ties 
between South Korea and Japan would further worsen, and that could affect cooperation between 
South Korea, the United States and Japan.”310 The United States is terrified of just this 
possibility. Tokyo’s limited moves towards collective self-defense have sent ripples of dread 
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across the Pacific.311 Even if Washington were not worried about a ‘Georgia scenario’312 or 
Japan taking unilateral preemptive action in a case of tactical entrapment, it is still “concerned 
that the current debate will inflame existing regional tensions and hinder attempts to improve 
Japanese–South Korean relations.”313 Chinese observers have already noted the sense of 
insecurity these moves may engender in their country, as well.314 
Anxieties about the most radical outcome of Japanese hedging and burdensharing have 
prompted officials to try to reassure Tokyo about the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. As 
worries mounted in 2013 over whether Japan might eventually weaponized its massive 
plutonium stockpiles, the Obama administration took the unprecedented step of allowing 
Japanese officials to tour American nuclear military facilities in Nebraska and Montana.315 The 
Asahi Shimbun quoted unnamed sources saying that“[t]he move was also intended to prevent 
Japan from developing nuclear weapons using its massive stockpile of plutonium to counter 
potential threats from its neighbors in East Asia,” although Bradley Roberts, Obama’s former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, dismissed this 
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view.316  Chinese and South Korean stress levels had continued to rise until the United States 
acquired control over some of the supplies in March 2014.317 It is still an open question whether 
Japan will eventually acquire nuclear weapons.318 
 
Overcoming the Burdensharing Dilemma? 
 Some senior American advisers are prepared to countenance greater allied burdensharing 
without even considering the possible negative ramifications.319 Most are not. A variety of 
organizational and conceptual frameworks, many only half-formed, are being debated and 
implemented to different degrees in an attempt to continue America’s ability to exert restraint 
and control over Japan’s expanding military activity. Yet they continue to run aground on the 
inherent difficulty of the burdensharing dilemma. 
 One method, as detailed above, is simply to oppose the acquisition of weapons and 
military postures that promise Japanese autonomy with a near absolute American commitment. 
A proponent of this mechanism is former National Security Council Asia director Michael 
Green. Worried that long-range ballistic and cruise missiles could risk tactical and strategic 
entrapment, Green has been quoted as suggesting that “[e]ven if Japan possessed the capability 
to attack enemy bases, it would be limited so it would be the United States that would have to 
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deal with any counterattack.”320 Likewise, James Schoff, former senior adviser for East Asia 
policy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has offered a “Front Office/Back Office 
Concept.”321 It would seek to maintain “the overall division of labor” while deepening 
“integration in certain support functions.” This would be different from the old sword-shield 
dichotomy, yet it would try to funnel greater Japanese contributions primarily into intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, antisubmarine warfare, missile defense, and 
logistical support—functions that could not result in entrapment. Indeed, Schoff suggests, “[a] 
limit on Japanese forward presence, which this concept would provide, should receive a positive 
response in the region.”  Yet, the concept also recognizes that there will inevitably be 
circumstances in which the front and back offices are reversed. And if Japanese civilian and 
military leaders are certain upon the path to more strategic autonomy, the US will be able to 
discourage them from seeking a more balanced and capable force only with great difficulty. 
 A second method is what Victor Cha has called an “adhesion” strategy, which is the 
opposite of a “distancing” approach.322 Since no one influential is contemplating the withdrawal 
of US forces in Japan in public, if at all, Washington cannot realistically hope that rhetorically 
distancing American policy from Japanese policy over, for example, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
is enough to nullify the burdensharing dilemma. ‘Strategic ambiguity’ is difficult when US 
garrisons physically ensure security commitments. Instead, many Americans policymakers 
believe binding themselves even closer to their allies can achieve a similar outcome of influence 
and control. Patrick Cronin, a senior director at CNAS and former senior director at the National 
Defense University, has delicately suggested, “we hug our Japanese ally very closely,” so that 
                                                
320 Quoted in “Japan Seeks Tough Stance.” 
321 James L. Schoff, “How to Upgrade U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, January 16, 2014. 
322 Cha, 195. 
Douglas 73 
the United States can “make sure that their capacity, their roles and missions as they change, are 
good for the overall region and good for U.S. interests.”323 For example, according to unnamed 
Japanese and US sources, Washington and Tokyo will “create a permanent consultative body to 
coordinate the operations of the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military” following the 
revision of the Defense Cooperation Guidelines later this year.324 Here again, Michael Green 
provides the most coherent explanation: “I would say to those that are worried about entrapment, 
that if you’re worried about entrapment, that Japan would somehow draw the U.S. into a conflict 
we don’t want, that’s all the more reason why we need to be joint, and we need a joint strategy, 
and thinking jointly about escalation.”325 In the US-Japan alliance, Green explained elsewhere, 
American policymakers lack the “joint and combined alliance,” or rather, high degree of 
asymmetric US control, that the United States has in NATO and the US-ROK alliance, primarily 
because Yoshida refused to subordinate his country’s military to American vassal status. The 
more “jointness” the United States can create, the easier it will be to get inside Japanese 
“decisionmaking loops.” Even Green, however, has acknowledged that if US officials “missed 
that opportunity, for whatever reason,” and Japan provokes an incident that escalates to war, the 
outcome is simple: “Then we have a problem.” 326 
 
Conclusion 
The burdernsharing dilemma is even more acute in the Rebalance or Pivot to Asia than it 
was during the Cold War. For perhaps the first time in the history of the alliance, Japan is more 
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worried about abandonment than entrapment and the United States is more worried about 
entrapment than abandonment. The United States faces serious constraints in matching China’s 
increases in military power, and Asian geopolitical conflicts continue to fester. Tokyo is 
therefore beginning a serious hedging strategy. While Americans officials welcome greater 
Japanese enthusiasm for burdensharing, they also fear how the loss of control the US necessarily 
suffers could result in an unwanted war provoked by risky Japanese military behavior, as well as 
the creation of a general environment involving arms races and security spirals in which war is 
more likely. Washington has been trying to overcome the burdensharing dilemma by 
discouraging certain kinds and styles of Japanese rearmament. Yet it is limited by a fundamental 
inability to exert more or the same influence over a sovereign state that is increasingly capable 
and autonomous. The United States may be retaining all of its commitment, but it is also losing 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 Americans cannot decide whether they want their allies to be weak or strong. There are 
obvious geopolitical incentives for encouraging allies to contribute to collective defense. Allied 
military power bolsters deterrence and relieves the incredible financial burdens usually 
maintained by “security guarantors”—or hegemons and empires. Yet when an ally’s capabilities 
grow, so too does its capacity for independent action. The cultivation of a military protectorate’s 
own power inevitably results in a loss of control for its patron state. Burdensharing is a double-
edged sword. 
 Certain characteristics of the post-World War II alliance structure make America 
particularly susceptible to this ‘burdensharing dilemma.’ In the case of the Japan, among many 
others, it was decided that extended deterrence necessitated the United States station its own 
forces on allied territory. If the US engineered its alliance so that it could not possibly avoid 
involvement in Japan’s wars, then the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and anyone else would 
be deterred from aggression. Yet when Beijing knows Washington is nearly automatically 
committed, so does Tokyo. America relinquished the most powerful and traditionally first 
method of restraint used in prewar European diplomacy—threatening nonsupport for behavior 
that could provoke unwanted war. The new model has created a new dynamic of alliance 
restraint and control: the burdensharing dilemma. So long as US garrisons continued to 
physically ensure the automaticity of commitments to defend Japan and other allies, the growth 
of allied military power will be looked on with fear and suspicion, especially if it is draped in 
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“1930s wrapping paper” that threatens to at least partially unravel Asia’s security 
environment.327 
 America’s strategy towards its Asian allies now stands at a crossroads. In the Cold War, 
the burdensharing dilemma was usually resolved into the low burdensharing-high control option. 
That solution is reversing in today’s Rebalance to Asia. Perhaps US-China and Sino-Japanese 
relations will not deteriorate further. History, however, and a realistic assessment of the widening 
gap between privilege and power in the Asian international system, are not grounds for 
optimism. If the burdensharing dilemma proves to be an inescapable facet of America’s 
particular brand of extended deterrence, then US attempts to regulate the remilitarization of 
Japan will founder upon the rocks of the Senkaku/Diaoyu.  
Beyond Japan, the United States is currently establishing small bases in Australia, 
Singapore, the Philippines, and perhaps Vietnam. If my theory is any guide, then Washington’s 
efforts may very well prove self-defeating. To deter China, these commitments would have to be 
strong enough to reassure US allies. If they are not, then the flexing of Chinese power will grow 
apace with its rapid increases in military strength, and the American strategy will fail. But even if 
US commitments are certain enough to invoke the element of automaticity, and China is at least 
more deterred, allied capitals will also identify the totality of the commitment. Aside from 
prudence, American allies will see little reason to compromise with Chinese demands. They have 
the automatic backing of the United States military behind them. Yet while the US commitment 
may be necessary and credible, it will not be sufficient. The rise of China and the stagnancy of 
America are contributing to the creation of an “Asian Power Web.”328 Arms races and the 
fashioning of links between the ‘spokes’ beyond the control of the ‘hub’ are following China’s 
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disruption to the Asian order. The burdernsharing dilemma predicts that as Asian militaries 
continue to expand their capabilities, the United States will be at a greater and greater risk of 
entrapment, both tactical and strategic.  
 The future for America in Asia is one of commitment without control. Washington may 
decide to accept the risks of alliance management, but the current arrangement promises no 
balance between deterring Beijing and restraining Tokyo. A new model of alliance relations is 
therefore necessary if Japan becomes an independent great power. The United States should 
accept that its role in the region is following a cyclical historical path. As Heraclitus understood, 
“a road up and down is one and the same road.”329 If the weakness of potential Asian allies was 
once reason to occupy them without fear—to overcome Snyder’s ‘alliance security dilemma’ 
between abandonment and entrapment—their strength today is reason to withdraw the 
automaticity of that commitment. America can no longer wholly suppress its allies’ desire for 
power and independence in security policy. The era of hegemony is over, and the epoch of the 
balance of power is begun again.  
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